

ON TRACK



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LIBYA: Canada's Contribution

Examining NATO in a Stormy Century Canada and the UN Security Council



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COVER PHOTO: To mark the return of Canadian military troops from the conflict to free Libya, a flight of CF18s from Squadron 425 Bagotville accompanied by a C130 Polarix was staged above the city of Ottawa. The event was called "The Victory Parade." Photo : Corporal Pierre Habib, Imaging Workshop, 3 Air Maintenance Squadron, 3 Wing Bagotville.. © 2011 DND-MDN Canada

PHOTO DE LA PAGE COUVERTURE: Pour l'occasion du retour des troupes militaires canadiennes du conflit de la libération de la Lybie, un vol en formation de CF-18 de l'Escadron 425 Bagotville en compagnie d'un C130 Polarix fut organisé au dessus de la ville d'Ottawa. L'évènement a été appelé "La parade de la victoire." Photo : Caporal Pierre Habib, Atelier d'Imagerie, 3e escadron maintenance air, 3e Escadre Bagotville.. © 2011 DND-MDN Canada

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From the Executive Director

Mot du Directeur exécutif

At the CDA Institute we are working hard to find policy solutions to the many defence and security challenges that Canada faces. We believe that effective defence and security policies must be based on rigorous and objective research and reasoned policy options. By sharing the results of our research and our recommendations with policymakers, politicians, academics and the public, we promote change in the policies of our federal government for the betterment of our country.



Colonel (Ret)
Alain M. Pellerin, OMM, CD

ON TRACK, the Institute's quarterly journal provides a medium of informed and non-partisan debate on defence and security matters. This Winter's edition features articles on Libya, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the United Nations Security Council, the 14th Annual Graduate Student Symposium, Canadian defence, cyber security, missile defence, and book reviews.

As we digest the success of Canada's contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) campaign to facilitate the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi with the observations of Ferry de Kerckhove, Tony White and Uri Marantz, we should ask ourselves where Libya is going. Richard Cohen and Dr. Jack Granatstein are both introspective and prophetic in their examination of where NATO has gone before now and where they estimate the organisation may be headed.

Louis Delvoie and Paul Chapin, both former senior Foreign service officers, offer their views on where Canada might stand in regards to the UN's Security Council.

Arnav Manchanda sits down with three panellists from the Graduate Student Symposium to discuss the role of cyber security in our daily lives. Brigadier-General (Ret'd) James Cox provides us with his observations on the state of Canadian defence intelligence, and David McDonough writes on the phase adaptive approach to missile defence.

We have included in this edition a Letter to the Editor that deals with this issue of the F-35 JSF.

We close with book reviews by Dr. Granatstein on *Conquered into Liberty*, a book that focuses on the Seven Years War; by Dave Perry, on *The Savage War*; by Paul Hillier, on *Security Operations in the 21st Century*; and by Meghan Spilka O'Keefe, on Chris Alexander's *The Long Way Back: Afghanistan's Quest for Peace*.

In addition to producing *ON TRACK*, the CDA Institute continues to be involved in a number of initiatives in promoting the cause of the Canadian Forces, such as the

À l'Institut de la CAD nous travaillons fort pour trouver des politiques qui apportent des solutions aux nombreux défis auxquels le Canada fait face en matière de défense et de sécurité. Nous croyons que les politiques de défense et de sécurité efficaces doivent être fondées sur une recherche rigoureuse et objective et sur des options raisonnées en matière de politiques. En partageant les résultats de notre recherche et nos recommandations avec les auteurs de politiques, les politiciens, les universitaires et le public, nous faisons la promotion du changement dans les politiques de notre gouvernement fédéral pour améliorer le sort de notre pays.

ON TRACK, la revue trimestrielle de l'Institut, propose un véhicule permettant un débat informé et non partisan sur les questions de défense et de sécurité. Le numéro de cet hiver offre des articles sur la Libye, l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, le 14^e Symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés, la Défense canadienne, la cybersécurité, la défense antimissile et un compte rendu de lecture.

Alors que nous digérons le succès de la contribution du Canada à la campagne de l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord (OTAN) pour faciliter le renversement de Muammar Gaddafi, avec les observations de Ferry de Kerckhove, Tony White et Uri Marantz, nous devrions nous demander où va la Libye. Richard Cohen et Jack Granatstein sont tous les deux introspectifs et prophétiques dans leur examen ; ils se demandent où l'OTAN est allée avant, où elle en est maintenant et où ils estiment qu'elle peut se diriger.

Louis Delvoie et Paul Chapin, tous deux d'anciens hauts fonctionnaires du Service extérieur, offrent leurs points de vue sur la position que le Canada pourrait prendre concernant le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU.

Arnav Manchanda a rencontré trois des panélistes du Symposium des étudiants diplômés pour discuter du rôle de la cybersécurité dans nos vies de tous les jours. Le Brigadier-Général (ret.) James Cox nous fait part de ses observations sur l'état des services de renseignements de la Défense canadienne et David McDonough écrit sur la façon *phase adaptive* d'approcher la défense antimissiles.

Dans ce numéro, nous avons inclus une lettre à la rédaction qui traite de la question du F-35 JSF.

Nous terminerons avec des comptes rendus de lecture de M. Granatstein sur *Conquered into Liberty*, un livre qui porte sur la guerre de Sept Ans, de Dave Parry sur *The Savage War*, de Paul Hillier sur *Security Operations in the 21st Century*, et de Meghan Spilka O'Keefe sur *The Long Way Back: Afghanistan's Quest for Peace*, de Chris Alexander.

En plus de publier *ON TRACK*, l'Institut de la CAD continue à participer à un certain nombre d'initiatives de



Recipients of the Vimy Award and Dr. John Scott Cowan with the Rt. Hon. Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada. L-R: General (Ret'd) John de Chastelain (1992); General (Ret'd) Raymond Henault (2007); Major-General (Ret'd) David Fraser (2006); Major-General (Ret'd) Lewis MacKenzie (1993); Colonel, the Hon. John Fraser (1992); Dr. John Scott Cowan, President of the CDA Institute; Major-General Jonathan Vance (2011); the Rt. Hon. Beverley McLachlan; General (Ret'd) Paul Manson, Past President of the CDA Institute (2003 Vimy Award recipient); and Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) Larry Murray (1998).

Photo by: Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe

Les récipiendaires de la Distinction honorifique Vimy et M. John Scott Cowan avec la très hon. Beverley McLachlin, le juge en chef du Canada. G-R: le Général (ret) John de Chastelain (1992); le Général (ret) Raymond Henault (2007); le Major-général (ret) David Fraser ((2006); le Major-général (ret) Lewis MacKenzie (1993); le Colonel, l'hon. John Fraser (1992); M. John Scott Cowan, Président de l'Institut de CAD; le Major-général Jonathan Vance (2011); la très hon. Beverley McLachlan; le Général (ret) Paul Manson, ancien président de l'Institut de la CAD (récipiendaire de la Distinction honorifique Vimy en 2003); et le Vice-amiral (ret) Larry Murray (1998).

Photo: le Lieutenant-colonel (ret) Gord Metcalfe

Annual Graduate Student Symposium, the Vimy Award, the Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security, and numerous round table discussions.

Looking back to the end of October, I am pleased to report that the 14th Annual Graduate Student Symposium was an unqualified success. The Symposium was presented by the CDA Institute, in collaboration with the Royal Military College of Canada and with the financial support of the Queen's Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen's Defence Management Studies, the DND-sponsored Security and Defence Forum, Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI), and the Hon. Hugh Segal.

The symposium featured three keynote speakers, Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Serge Labbé, Dr. Ann Fitz-Gerald, and Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope. The presenters showed once again, this year, the high-caliber of research being pursued by students that is worthy of all of our attention. Paul

promotion de la cause des Forces canadiennes, comme le Symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés, le Prix Vimy, la Conférence d'Ottawa sur la défense et la sécurité et de nombreuses discussions en table ronde.

En me reportant à la fin d'octobre dernier, je suis heureux d'annoncer que le 14^e Symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés a remporté un succès sans conteste. Le Symposium était présenté par L'Institut de la CAD en collaboration avec le Collège militaire royal du Canada et avec l'aide financière du Centre for International and Defence Policy de l'Université Queen's, des Defence Managements Studies de Queen's, du Forum sur la défense et la sécurité parrainé par le MDN et de l'Honorable Hugh Segal.

Le symposium présentait trois conférenciers invités, le Brigadier-Général (ret.) Serge Labbé, Mme Ann Fitz-Gerald et le Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope. Les présentateurs ont montré encore cette année le calibre élevé de la recherche

Hillier, the Institute's Project Officer, was the principal organizer of the symposium, and has provided a report on the proceedings.

The CDA Institute was honoured on November 18 when the Rt. Hon. Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada, presented the Vimy Award on behalf of the CDA Institute to Major-General Jonathan Vance before a record number of guests at a reception and formal dinner at the Canadian War Museum. With his acceptance of the Award, Major-General Vance addressed the guests at the dinner. We have included Major-General Vance's address in this issue of *ON TRACK*.

Thomas d'Aquino addressed the guests attending the Vimy Award dinner by drawing attention to developments at the CDA Institute, in particular, the fundraising campaign recently launched by the Institute. His remarks appear elsewhere in these pages.

Amongst those in attendance on November 18 were many of Canada's corporate leaders who are supportive of the aims of the CDA Institute to increase public awareness of the significant and outstanding contribution made by a Canadian to the security of Canada and the preservation of our democratic values.

The evening, under the presidency of Dr. John Scott Cowan, was dignified by the presence of the Rt. Hon. Beverley McLaughlin, and Mr. Frank McArdle; General Walter Natynczyk, Chief of the Defence Staff, and Mrs. Leslie Natynczyk; Major-General Jonathan Vance and Mrs. Jennifer Vance; previous recipients of the Vimy Award and of the Ross Munro media Award; Officer Cadets of the Royal Military College of Canada and Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean; members of the Canadian Forces; and many other distinguished guests.

The Vimy Award gala was filled with colour and ceremony, generously provided by the Regimental Band of the Governor General's Foot Guards, the Regimental Pipes of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, the Pianist and the Canadian Forces String Ensemble from the Central Band of the Canadian Forces.

The valuable support of our corporate sponsors and CDA members contributed to a very significant event that was appreciated by everyone who attended. Our public thanks to our corporate sponsors appears elsewhere in this issue of *ON TRACK*.

Looking forward to events, the CDA Institute and CDA will present their annual seminar, *The 2012 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security*, on Thursday and Friday, 23-24 February, 2012, at the Fairmont Château Laurier Hotel in Ottawa. This annual conference is Canada's most important platform from which defence and security issues are explored.

Speakers will include the Hon. John Baird, Minister of Foreign Affairs (invited); the Hon. Peter MacKay, Minister

poursuivie par les étudiants, qui mérite toute notre attention. Paul Hillier, l'agent de projet de l'Institut, fut le principal organisateur du symposium, et il nous offre un rapport sur les débats.

L'Institut de la CAD a été honoré, le 18 novembre, quand la Très Honorable Beverley McLachlin, juge en chef du Canada, a présenté le Prix Vimy, au nom de l'Institut de la CAD, au Major-Général Jonathan Vance devant un nombre record d'invités à une réception et un dîner de gala tenus au Musée canadien de la guerre. Avec son acceptation du prix le Major-Général Vance a pris la parole devant les invités au dîner. Nous incluons l'allocution du Major-Général Vance dans ce numéro de *ON TRACK*.

Thomas d'Aquino s'est adressé aux invités qui assistaient au dîner du Prix Vimy en attirant leur attention sur les développements qui ont cours à l'Institut de la CAD et, en particulier, sur la campagne de collecte de fonds récemment lancée par l'Institut. Ses remarques paraissent ailleurs dans ces pages.

Parmi les personnes présentes le 18 novembre on comptait un grand nombre de dirigeants d'entreprises du Canada qui appuient les buts de l'Institut de la CAD, c'est-à-dire de sensibiliser davantage la population à la contribution significative et exceptionnelle d'un Canadien ou d'une Canadienne à la sécurité du Canada et à la préservation de nos valeurs démocratiques.

Placée sous la présidence de M. John Scott Cowan, la soirée a été rehaussée par la présence de la Très Honorable Beverley McLaughlin et M. Frank McArdle, du Général Walter Natynczyk, chef de l'état major de la Défense, et Mme Leslie Natynczyk, du Major-Général Jonathan Vance et Mme Jennifer Vance, de précédents récipiendaires du Prix Vimy et du prix Ross Munro Media Award, d'élèves officiers du Collège militaire royal du Canada et du Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, de membres des Forces canadiennes et de nombreux autres invités de marque.

Le gala du Prix Vimy fut haut en couleur et en fastes, grâce à la présence généreuse de la musique régimentaire des Governor General's Foot Guards, des Regimental Pipes des Cameron Highlanders d'Ottawa, du pianiste / [NB OR de la pianiste – please adjust according to facts] et de l'ensemble à cordes des Forces canadiennes, de la Musique centrale des Forces canadiennes.

Le précieux appui de nos entreprises commanditaires et des membres de la CAD a contribué à une activité très significative qui fut appréciée par toutes les personnes présentes. Les remerciements publics que nous adressons à nos sociétés commanditaires paraissent ailleurs dans ce numéro de *ON TRACK*.

Pour ce qui est des activités à venir, l'Institut de la CAD et la CAD vont présenter leur séminaire annuel, *La conférence d'Ottawa 2012 sur la défense et la sécurité*, le jeudi et le vendredi 23 et 24 février 2012, à l'hôtel Fairmont Château Laurier d'Ottawa. Cette conférence annuelle est la plateforme la plus importante d'Ottawa où on explore les questions de défense et de sécurité.

On comptera parmi les conférenciers l'Honorable John Baird, ministre des Affaires étrangères (invité), l'Ho-

of National Defence; the US Secretary of the Navy, Ray Mabus; Commander US Central Command General James Mattis; the UK Chief of Defence Staff, Sir David Richards; the Canadian CDS, General Walter Natynczyk, and Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard, to name a few. Former Israeli National Security Advisor Dr. Uzi Arad will also deliver a keynote address. The notice of the 2012 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security appears on page 29 of this publication. The agenda and registration are available at <http://cda-cdai.ca/cdai/defence-seminars/ottawaconference2012>.

Year 2012 holds a special significance for both the Conference of Defence Associations and the CDA Institute: the Conference of Defence Associations will celebrate its 80 years of success as Canada's Voice of Defence, while the CDA Institute will observe the 25th anniversary of its founding. In celebration, the CDA Institute will continue with its mandate to promote informed public debate on national security and defence issues, which it fulfills through activities such as the Vimy Award programme, the annual *Ottawa Conference on Defence & Security*, the annual Graduate Student Symposium, publications, such as the Vimy papers, and hosting regular roundtable and speaking engagements. These events will be announced throughout the year on the Institute's website, at <http://cda-cdai.ca/cdai/>, and in *ON TRACK*.

In closing, I wish to thank our benefactors, particularly our patrons, companions, and officer level donors, for their financial support for the work of the CDA Institute, without whom we would be hard-pressed to fulfil our mandate.

If you are not already a donor to the CDA Institute, I would ask you to become one and recruit a friend. If you join at the Supporter level with a donation of \$75 or higher, you will receive the following benefits for 12 months:

norable Peter McKay, ministre de la Défense nationale, le US Secretary of the Navy, Ray Mabus, le Commander US Central Command General James Mattis, le chef de l'état-major de la Défense du Royaume-Uni, Sir David Richards, le chef de l'état-major de la Défense du Canada, le Général Walter Natynczyk, et le Lieutenant-Général Charles Bouchard, entre autres. L'avis de convocation à la Conférence d'Ottawa 2012 sur la défense et la sécurité paraît à la page 29 de ce numéro. On trouvera l'ordre du jour et l'inscription à <http://cda-cdai.ca/cdai/defence-seminars/ottawaconference2012>

L'année 2012 a une signification particulière pour la Conférence des associations de la défense et l'Institut de la CAD : la Conférence des associations de la défense célébrera ses 80 ans de succès comme voix du Canada en matière de défense, alors que l'Institut de la CAD marquera le 25^e anniversaire de sa fondation. Pour célébrer ces événements, l'Institut de la CAD poursuivra son mandat de promouvoir un débat public éclairé sur les questions de sécurité nationale et de défense, mandat dont il s'acquitte par des activités comme le programme du Prix Vimy, la *Conférence annuelle d'Ottawa sur la défense et la sécurité*, le Symposium annuel des étudiants diplômés, des publications comme les Cahiers Vimy, et par la tenue de tables rondes régulières et d'un calendrier d'allocutions. Ces activités seront annoncées tout au long de l'année sur le site Web de l'Institut, à <http://cda-cdai.ca/cdai/>, et dans *ON TRACK*.

En terminant, je désire remercier nos bienfaiteurs, particulièrement nos donateurs des niveaux patron, compagnon et officier pour leur appui financier au travail de l'Institut de la CAD, sans lesquels il nous serait difficile de nous acquitter de notre mandat.

Si vous n'êtes pas déjà un donateur à l'Institut de la CAD, je vous demanderais d'en devenir un et de recruter un ami. Si vous vous joignez au niveau supporteur, avec un don de 75 \$, ou à un niveau plus élevé, vous recevrez les bénéfices suivants pendant les 12 mois qui suivront votre don :



L-R: Major-General Jonathan Vance, 2011 Vimy Award recipient; the Rt. Hon. Beverley McLaughlin, Chief Justice of Canada; and General Walter Natynczyk, Chief of the Defence Staff / G-D: Le récipiendaire de la Distinction honorifique Vimy pour 2011, le Major-général Jonathan Vance; la très hon. Beverley McLaughlin, le juge en chef du Canada; et le Général Walter Natynczyk, le chef d'état-major de la Défense

Photo: Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Gord Metcalfe

- A charitable donation tax receipt;
- Four issues of the CDA Institute's quarterly magazine, *ON TRACK*;
- Advance copies of all other CDA Institute publications, such as the *Vimy Papers*; and,
- A discount registration rate at our annual conference.

A copy of the donor form is printed elsewhere in this journal. Donor forms are also available online at <http://cda-cdai.ca/cdai/become-a-donor>. ©

Thank you. ©

- Un reçu d'impôt pour don caritatif ;
- Quatre numéros de la revue trimestrielle *ON TRACK* de l'Institut de la CAD ;
- Des exemplaires anticipés de toutes les autres publications de l'Institut de la CAD, comme les *Cahiers Vimy* ; et
- Un tarif à escompte pour l'inscription à notre conférence annuelle.

Une copie du formulaire de donateur est imprimée ailleurs dans ce magazine et est également disponible sur notre site Web à <http://cda-cdai.ca/cdai/become-a-donor>. ©

Merci. ©



The Vimy Award

by Major-General Jonathan Vance

Address

Madame Chief Justice and Mr. McArdle, Dr. Cowan and Dr. Erki, General and Mrs. Leslie Natyncyk, Lieutenant-général et Madame Thérèse Evraire, Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Vance, Vice-Admiral and Mrs. Gina Donaldson, honoured recipients of the Vimy and Ross Munro Media awards present this evening, staff and executive leadership of Conference of Defence Associations and the CDA Institute, General and Flag Officers, industry executives and sponsors, members of The Royal Canadian Regiment who have made a special effort to be here, Task Force Kandahar veterans, honoured guests, dear friends: Good evening and thank you so much for being here. I kind of hate to ruin it for you with a speech. But I promise to keep it short and from the heart, and may I offer my own congratulations to this year's Ross Munro Media Award winner (Rosie diManno).

Tout d'abord, j'aimerais remercier sincèrement L'Institut de la conférence des associations de la défense et le comité de sélection de m'avoir choisi comme récipiendaire du prix Vimy cette année. Je ne savais pas que j'étais en nomination. Je suis à la fois honoré et touché que vous ayez pensé à moi pour recevoir ce prix.

My wonderful Aunt Carolyn, who lives in BC and could not be here this evening, reminded me that my Grandfather fought at Vimy Ridge when she heard the news, and that this honour seems a bit of a full circle moment for our family for which he would have been proud. Nevertheless, I must

confess to feeling somewhat awkward and self-conscious about it as well. It is not false modesty to say, particularly in this business, that one is entirely dependent upon a team approach, and an environment that encourages initiative, accepts risk and supports leaders. I must share this moment, so with your permission I would like to accept this honour on behalf of so many – a few to be singled out this evening - who are more responsible

than I for the final result of your selection deliberations.

Ladies and gentlemen, may I introduce to you my father, Lieutenant-General (Retd) Jack Vance. A discussion theme of ours, Dad and I, over the past several years has been comparing the time he was in uniform to the present. A time of Cold War to one of near-continuous combat operations, a time of unlimited liability promised to one of unlimited liability collected, a time of staying true to principles in preparing for war to a time where we today are mighty grateful that you did. You see Dad, it was on the shoulders of your contribution and that of your generation that we retained a warrior ethos of service before self, of being ready for war, and mastering enough of the basics to be able to raise the bar and bring to bear a credible contribution in Afghanistan and Libya. On more than one occasion in Afghanistan I whispered thanks to the legions of officers and senior NCOs you and your peers trained, often in an environment that scoffed at the prospects of war again, and who in turn passed on the fundamentals that reside today throughout the CF. And, I could not have asked for a better role model of leadership and wisdom than you. Many of us curse it when we start to sound like our parents...well just to let you know, more often than not I gave silent thanks. And to our regiment, The Royal Canadian Regiment, the regimental motto «Never Pass A Fault» really

Major-General Vance joined the Canadian Forces in 1982 and was commissioned as an infantry officer into The Royal Canadian Regiment in 1986 following his graduation from Royal Roads Military College. He is the Director of Staff, Strategic Joint Staff, National Defence Headquarters.

ON TRACK

does work very well in all situations. Thanks Dad.

Now that foundation and wisdom means little if our families aren't equally courageous and able to support the prolonged absences of their spouses. I learned what strength and grace under pressure means when I had to say to my wife Jennifer, «honey I've got to go back to Kandahar tomorrow». Me trying not to smile and her trying not to cry... if that's not the title of a country song it should be. My thanks to you, Sweetheart, and through you to all our families who, through smiles and tears, are the very fabric of service life.

There is one other guest here this evening who, more than anybody, taught and mentored me throughout my career until a few years ago when he retired. When I say 'throughout my career' I mean it. He was my immediate superior at every level of command. He was my company commander in 1986 when I was a new platoon commander, my battalion commander when I was an Officer Commanding, my brigade commander as a Commanding Officer, and my area commander when I commanded 1 Brigade - and then we were both in Afghanistan together in 2009. To him I owe huge thanks for the better part of a working lifetime of leadership and guidance...and he can rightly claim credit and accept blame for how I turned out in whatever parts you may wish to dole out - ladies and gentlemen, Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Mark Skidmore.

Ce que nous avons accompli et ce que nous continuons de faire sur le terrain, nous le redevons à nos troupes: nos soldats, marins, hommes et femmes de la force aérienne, membres des forces spéciales, l'équipe pangouvernementale ainsi qu'au soutien du personnel civil.

Remarkable people who bring talent, dedication, a sense of humour and a sense of purpose to the mission - and who gave me inspiration everyday. The best ideas always come from somewhere between master corporal and major... and I am unashamed to admit to very little original thought in Kandahar, preferring instead to guide the waves of initiative, intellect and enthusiasm. Anyone who has ever had the pleasure of working closely with a regimental sergeant major, a coxwain or a chief knows what I mean when I say it's hard to describe what they do, but when they don't do it you know it and things don't go well. My battle buddy, my friend, the best soldier I know, and whose wise counsel to me everyday contributed to the mission more than I can ever say - ladies and gentlemen, Chief Warrant Officer Stan Stapleford. Also at that table, a man who epitomizes the term 'backbone' of the army. I hand picked him from a potential cast of hundreds to command my vehicle and lead my tactical headquarters

as we did our work throughout Kandahar - and I'm so very glad I did. A two-tour veteran of TFK, calm under fire, honest under pressure, and hilarious under the influence - ladies and gentlemen a true leader and warrior, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Sergeant Kiwi Parsons. To both of these gentlemen and to their counterparts on my second tour, Chief Warrant Officer Armand Vinet and Adjutant Oigny, I owe my thanks as well as my life.

Je tiens également à remercier ceux qui m'ont guidé alors que j'étais commandant de la Force opérationnelle à Kandahar. Nous avons eu la chance d'avoir parmi nous ce soir, les lieutenants-généraux à la retraite, Mike Gauthier et Marc Lessard, anciens commandants de la Force expéditionnaire du Canada. Gérer et diriger une mission aussi complexe que celle-ci, tout en continuant de s'occuper des enjeux, au pays, afin d'aider nos soldats à garder moral et l'esprit de combat, souvent au détriment du vôtre, était une tâche difficile. Je vous serai toujours reconnaissant pour votre leadership, votre sagesse, mais aussi pour votre pardon.

On my way to becoming commander TFK, the Commander of the Army at the time, Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, ensured that I and my HQ and the TFs I commanded were equipped and ready. No easy task, and one that demanded the encouragement of freedom of thought and action at all levels. As the principle architect of the combat power that allowed us to bring the heat when we needed to I and everyone who ever served in theatre thank you.

Finally, a man who, at a critical juncture, said just the right thing, gave me just the right advice and was the difference between totally shattered confidence and probable failure on my part and the hopeful beginnings of a successful strategy that ultimately found traction. He doesn't get thanked often in public, he is usually the one applauding and cheering all of us, and whose leadership has been a sheer inspiration to all who serve. We would not have been successful at any level without him and we all know it...sir please accept my undying thanks and admiration, ladies and gentlemen, our Chief of the Defence Staff.

To the Conference of Defence Associations and the CDA Institute, I laud your efforts to encourage informed debate when many around you seem determined to stay in the shallow end. On behalf of those I've named this evening, and thousands more, I humbly accept the Vimy Award for 2011. ©

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Address by Thomas d'Aquino

VIMY DINNER NOVEMBER 18, 2011

Thank you, Dr. Cowan, for that kind introduction.

My purpose is to draw your attention to developments at the CDA Institute which I think will be of interest to those attending this wonderful evening -- and in due course will be important for all Canadians.

Comme la plupart d'entre vous le savez, l'Institut de la CAD a été, pendant des années, la principale voix indépendante du Canada sur les questions de défense et de sécurité qui importent aux Canadiens. À témoin: ses conférences et ses séminaires, ses études sur des sujets aussi divers que la sécurité énergétique du Canada, l'avenir du Canada dans l'OTAN et la mission du Canada en Afghanistan, et les analystes qu'il offre à tous les médias d'importance, que ce soit pour la presse écrite, la radio, la télévision ou le Web.

(As most will know, for years the CDA Institute has been Canada's leading independent voice on defence and security issues which matter to Canadians. It has done so through its conferences and seminars, through studies on subjects as diverse as Canada's energy security, Canada's future in NATO, and Canada's mission in Afghanistan; and through providing analysts to every major media outlet spanning print, radio, television and the web.)

These efforts reflect the Institute's mission of "Promoting informed public debate on national security and defence", and their success is not to be doubted. They have helped to produce better public policy, better government decisions, and better outcomes for Canada.

Remarkably, the Institute's successes have been achieved with a handful of staff, notably its renowned and long-serving Executive Director, Colonel Alain Pellerin; through the many from the military, academic, government, diplomacy and business who have volunteered their time; and even within a very small operating budget, underwritten almost entirely by those who have partnered with the Institute to bring us the annual Vimy Dinner and the annual Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security.

Au moment où la mission de combat du Canada en Afghanistan tire à sa fin, et alors que le gouvernement cherche à faire des économies pour rééquilibrer les comptes publics, on

a besoin d'articuler une perspective d'avenir qui a un sens en matière de politique de défense canadienne.

(As Canada's combat mission in Afghanistan draws to a close, and as the government looks for savings to restore balance to public accounts, there's a need to articulate a sensible forward outlook in Canadian defence policy.)

To that end, the Board of Directors of the Institute -- of which I am proud to be a member -- is determined to enhance the Institute's capacity to pursue its mission to inform the national debate on defence and security issues.

Dans une première phase, le plan consiste à doubler la production de produits et services de l'Institut qui ont pour but d'informer le gouvernement, le parlement, les médias et le grand public. Nous serions ainsi en mesure d'agrandir la portée de l'Institut en établissant une connexion avec ceux qui font et qui influencent les politiques de défense et de sécurité.

(In a first phase, the plan is to roughly double the Institute's output of products and services to inform government, Parliament, the media and the public at large. This would help extend the Institute's reach in connecting with those who make and influence defence and security policy.)

In a second phase, the Institute would consider new ventures to raise the quality of the national debate on defence and security and enhance its value to partners in practical ways we can only now imagine.

However, expanding the Institute's capacity, extending its reach, broadening its scope of operations, and heightening its impact are going to require resources the Institute does not now have. And with this, the Institute is looking to build on the partnerships it already has, and to create new ones. This is an endeavour I am pleased to support. I hope you will join me as a partner in this noble cause. ©

Thomas d'Aquino is senior counsel in Gowlings' Ottawa office. Mr. d'Aquino has served as a Special Assistant to the Prime Minister of Canada and as the founder and chief executive of Intercounsel Limited, and as the chief executive and president of the Canadian Council of Chief Executives (CCCE) from 1981 to 2009. He also serves as Distinguished Visiting Professor at NPSIA, Carleton University.



La Libye et le Printemps arabe: aberration ou préambule ?

par Ferry de Kerckhove

Ferry de Kerckhove écrit que l'OTAN aura regagné en crédibilité au grand dam de ses détracteurs professionnels, suite au succès de l'Opération Unified Protector. Il nous dresse un bilan du monde arabo-méditerranéen et, en ajoutant qu'une intervention systématique de l'Occident dans les mouvances imprévisibles du printemps arabe sont impensables, demande que doivent faire les pays occidentaux, à commencer par le Canada. .

Le Lieutenant-général Charles Bouchard, Commandant de la force opérationnelle interarmées internationale en Libye, a été honoré pour la direction d'une campagne admirable. Le général a aussi brillé par ses talents de diplomate quand, sans préjuger de l'avenir et de décisions politiques éventuelles, a sagement évoqué les différences de situations entre celle qui suscita l'Opération Unified Protector et les autres auxquelles la communauté internationale pourrait être appelée à réagir par la force. L'OTAN aura regagné en crédibilité au grand dam de ses détracteurs professionnels.

Les conditions de l'opération libyenne étaient uniques sur pratiquement tous les plans :

- un mégalomane dangereux depuis des décennies,
- une population clairsemée et un terrain relativement facile d'accès au plan militaire sans devoir y expédier des troupes,
- des représailles outrageantes contre la population, rebelles et citoyens confondus,
- des ressources pétrolières importantes notamment pour les pays méditerranéens européens,
- le risque de sécessions tribales avec ascendances islamiques,
- une coalition animée par les Européens – avec un appui militaire américain important – plus difficile à rejeter par les Russes et les Chinois dès lors que la Ligue arabe s'y associait
- enfin, l'opération libyenne était le premier cas d'espèce, ce qui permit l'adoption, ardue, des résolutions 1970 et 1973 des Nations Unies.

La carte du monde arabo-méditerranéen illustre combien une intervention systématique de l'Occident dans les mouvances imprévisibles du printemps arabe est impensable. Simplifions :

Tunisie - affaire réglée : les Islamistes modérés sont au pouvoir. Le pays reste délibérément tourné vers l'Europe. Mais à long terme, la scission palpable entre la côte et l'intérieur créeront des remous et l'évolution dans la région influencera les choix tunisiens.

Algérie: un chaudron bouillant même si personne ne veut revivre les massacres des années 1994-2002; mais

les rancœurs jamais effacées de la colonisation, le rejet de la francité et l'échec de l'arabisation, et l'existence d'un islamisme dur, pourraient la plonger dans une version brutale du printemps arabe face à un régime militaire totalitaire. Toute intervention extérieure serait catastrophique.

Maroc : De vraies réformes mais une mise en œuvre difficile. Un roi bienveillant, Prince des Croyants, mais dont la crédibilité est minée par son entourage. L'islamisme se renforce. Le Maroc reste le pays, de toute la région, le plus tourné vers l'occident.

Libye : affaire réglée ? pas certain. Le défi de la reconstruction et de la réconciliation demeure considérable et le climat d'exaction ne contribue ni à l'un ni à l'autre ! L'islamisme pourrait y devenir intolérant.

L'Égypte : La révolution a été trop brève. La victoire, trop rapide. Les militaires, habiles, ont vite déchu celui qui était devenu un handicap à leur pouvoir. Les islamistes ont occupé le vrai terrain pendant que les révolutionnaires restaient place Tahrir, pour ensuite se diviser en une multitude de partis. Les militaires veulent garder le contrôle politique tant pour préserver leurs privilèges que pour éviter à leur tour de comparaître en justice. La seule solution pour eux est une entente sur le partage des dépouilles de la révolution avec les Frères Musulmans. L'Occident ne voudra pas choisir de camp jusqu'à ce que la montée en force de l'Islamisme - Salafistes aidant - puisse ne laisser d'autre choix à l'Ouest que de soutenir les militaires pour protéger ses intérêts stratégiques. La majorité silencieuse égyptienne, habituée à une stabilité morose, finirait par accepter un sort sur lequel elle n'aura pas eu grand-chose à dire.

Jordanie : Le dialogue amorcé par le Roi Abdullah ne semble pas avoir eu de succès. La composition ethnique du pays ajoute à la volatilité d'un printemps arabe mal maîtrisé. La monarchie elle-même pourrait être menacée.

Syrie : Elle est la preuve de l'incapacité de l'Occident de répéter l'opération libyenne. La remarquable défense de la Responsabilité de Protéger (R2P) par le ministre McKay dans le contexte libyen lors de la conférence de Halifax en novembre 2011 n'a fait que souligner que la R2P n'offre pas de gabarit unique ! Le recours à une force d'interposition dans ce qui est en train de devenir une guerre civile entraînerait sans doute un désastre humanitaire plus catastrophique que celui auquel on assiste. Des frappes aériennes dans des zones de densité beaucoup plus fortes feraient plus de victimes que le carnage actuel. Seul point positif, la Ligue Arabe, si faible

Ferry de Kerckhove, Chercheur invité, Université d'Ottawa, et membre du Conseil d'administration de l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense.

Northern Africa and the Middle East



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et désavouée qu'elle soit, commence au moins à intervenir.

Irak : Le pays émerge de plus de neuf ans d'intervention extérieure. À la fragilité de l'équilibre politique et aux fractures crises ethniques et religieuses s'ajoute l'instabilité inhérente au départ des troupes américaines. Il n'y aura plus d'intervention extérieure en Irak.

Bahrayn : Les monarchies s'en tirent mieux que les républiques dictatoriales. Le Bahrayn le prouve. Le mur de la peur, grâce au déferlement des forces saoudiennes et des Émirats, n'a pas été brisé. Pas question de laisser une telle place forte du Golfe, voisin de l'Iran, et élément clé du dispositif stratégique américain, tomber entre les mains de la majorité shiite. L'enquête internationale ordonnée par le souverain n'a conduit à aucune condamnation des auteurs de la répression. Intervention contre-révolutionnaire réussie!

Yémen? Un cas intéressant d'intervention dans ce pays en déliquescence, attaqué sur tous les fronts – sécessionnistes au sud, Houthis au Nord, Al-Qaeda très présent, avec un arrière-plan de corruption, de chômage et de conditions économiques déplorables. Après 10 mois de manifestations dans la rue, le Président Saleh a signé un accord élaboré par ses voisins du Golfe et fortement appuyé par les États-Unis en échange de l'immunité. L'immunité a provoqué la poursuite des manifestations et aujourd'hui, on s'inquiète d'un retour éventuel de Saleh au pouvoir. Une intervention être nécessaire mais elle ne laissera personne satisfaite..

Liban : La division est au cœur de son essence et de sa constitution. Quant aux interventions, elles sont son lot quasi quotidien. En guerre larvée avec Israël, sous quasi

tutelle de la Syrie via le Hezbollah - le Liban est toujours au bord de l'abysse. Mais si le pays s'effondre, il en entraînera d'autres avec lui.

Soudan : il fait partie de la mouvance arabe. Après le referendum sur la sécession du Sud, un nouveau pays est né, déjà presque en état de déliquescence. Le conflit pour le contrôle des champs pétroliers de la région d'Abyei est en cours. Une grande incertitude demeure quant à l'avenir des deux pays.

De ce tour d'horizon impressionniste émerge un ensemble de conclusions :

Même si quatre dictateurs sont tombés, la volonté de changement qui a imprégné le printemps arabe est loin de s'être traduite par l'avènement de la démocratie et du respect des droits de la personne dans le monde arabe. Plus une secousse séismique dans le monde politique est importante plus il faut du temps pour que la transformation s'implante dans les mœurs et cultures des pays, sans compter les combats d'arrière-garde de ceux qui ont tout à perdre. Le jugement sur le printemps arabe doit être porté sur un horizon de vingt ans, pas de 12 mois.

L'incertitude et l'inquiétude prévalent à l'aube du deuxième printemps. Ayant exulté face au renversement des dictatures, l'Occident s'inquiète de la montée de l'autoritarisme théocratique des partis islamistes. On parle même de victoire dérobée à la jeunesse arabe. Cela dit, les partis islamistes ont le droit d'exister. En outre, bien que les manifestants aient presque partout rompu les digues de la peur, souvent la population en général, la majorité silencieuse, s'est effarouchée devant le changement, abrutie souvent

par 30 ans de régime dictatorial, craignant de perdre le peu qu'elle avait accumulé. Il y a aussi la crainte de mouvements sécessionnistes ou de bouleversements dans les rapports de force entre groupes ethniques ou dans le sort des minorités.

À l'Ouest, on a eu tendance à confondre volonté de changement et aspiration démocratique. Pour beaucoup de révolutionnaires, à commencer par le Tunisien Bouazizi, rancœur, humiliation, dégoût, corruption, inégalités et pauvreté ont été les véritables moteurs de mobilisation. La démocratie peut être une conséquence. Comme en témoigne le harcèlement des ONG en Égypte, la ferveur démocratique occidentale a souvent été perçue comme un instrument d'ingérence et d'imposition. Le rejet, au moins initial, du dialogue avec les partis islamistes a aussi été perçu comme une tentative de délégitimation d'un courant qui avait terriblement souffert sous les dictatures et qui exigeait sa place au soleil.

Le conflit israélo-palestinien n'a joué qu'un rôle mineur, au départ, dans le printemps arabe. Le monde extérieur pesait très peu dans l'équation des révolutionnaires de Tahrir et d'ailleurs. Mais à mesure que la révolution embrasait l'ensemble du monde arabe, les émotions populaires se sont nourries de l'obstacle israélien associé à la perception d'injustice de la part des Occidentaux, particulièrement des États-Unis. L'attitude du gouvernement israélien face au printemps arabe n'aida en rien, le Premier ministre Netanyahu, légitimement angoissé par les incidences du mouvement, s'étant campé dans une position de rejet total à son égard. L'échec de la campagne de l'Autorité palestinienne en faveur d'un siège aux Nations Unies a accentué la perception d'injustice de la part de l'Ouest dès qu'il s'agissait d'Israël. Il est certain que le pouvoir d'intervention des pays occidentaux en faveur d'une évolution positive dans le monde arabe gagnerait énormément d'autorité si une paix durable intervenait au Moyen-Orient.

Il y a aussi ceux qu'on passe sous silence au nom d'intérêts stratégiques, comme l'Arabie Saoudite dont le régime est l'un des moins démocratiques et les moins respectueux des droits de la personne. Ces silences affectent la crédibilité du message occidental.

L'Iran influence les réactions des pays arabes et des acteurs externes, surtout par sa capacité de nuisance. Le dossier nucléaire iranien demeure une préoccupation majeure. Mais là encore, la perception de deux poids deux mesures entre l'Iran et Israël sur le dossier nucléaire affecte la crédibilité du message pourtant fondamental envers l'Iran.

Alors que doivent faire les pays occidentaux, à

commencer par le Canada ? Quelques pistes de messages:

Appuyer le courant de réforme et de transformation du monde arabe, tout en soulignant ses risques et ses failles

S'attaquer aux problèmes économiques et sociaux des pays arabes en transition par une coopération ciblée à l'intention de la jeunesse, qui mette l'accent sur la modernité

Entamer un dialogue avec les partis et mouvements islamistes en mettant l'accent sur la séparation entre la religion et l'État, mais aussi accepter que le modèle islamique modéré puisse être la seule alternative aux régimes totalitaires antérieurs à condition qu'il offre des garanties à la population, notamment par l'adoption de constitutions séculières maintenir un langage cohérent envers les pays faisant face à des manifestations, notamment sur l'importance des processus de réforme, la consultation et l'ouverture et la condamnation systématique des violations des droits de la personne, particulièrement des femmes; rappeler le caractère universel des droits de la personne mais exprimer aussi le respect des diversités culturelles.

Dénoncer le sectarisme et les mouvements sécessionnistes et inviter à honorer les pluralismes.

Apporter dans le respect du génie local toute contribution utile dans la réforme ou la création d'institutions de gouvernance

Lutter contre la corruption dans les opérations commerciales impliquant les milieux d'affaires occidentaux

Soutenir les efforts de la Ligue arabe et offrir notre collaboration sur le plan institutionnel.

Encourager la Chine et la Russie à se joindre aux efforts de la communauté internationale en vue de mettre fin au carnage en Syrie.

Exercer les pressions nécessaires sur Israël et sur l'Autorité palestinienne pour qu'au printemps arabe soit associée enfin la paix au Moyen-Orient. C'est le seul conflit dont on connaît parfaitement l'issue mais à qui la volonté politique échappe.

L'année qui commence est pleine de risques mais aussi d'espoir. Et même si la Libye restera l'exception comme mode d'intervention armée, la communauté internationale peut faire beaucoup pour mitiger les risques et aider à réaliser les espoirs de toute une région. ©



A Chronology of NATO's involvement in Libya

by Tony White

Tony White writes on the preparations for Operation Unified Protector, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's mission to protect the people of Libya so they could decide their future in freedom and in peace, and on the successful outcome of the operation.

For the NATO Alliance, Libya was as much about political agility as it was about military flexibility.

Looking back at Operation Unified Protector it is easy to forget that this successful operation was preceded by an intense political effort that gave NATO commanders the direction they needed to plan and mount this remarkable air and maritime campaign in a matter of days.

NATO needed to be agile because at the time events in North Africa and the Middle East were unfolding at a rapid rate.

First in Tunisia, then in Egypt, public discontent was spreading quickly throughout the region at the beginning of 2011, as the Arab Spring took hold. A peaceful protest in neighbouring Libya, in February 2011, was met with violent repression. As demonstrations spread beyond Benghazi, the number of victims grew.

Within days the NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, announced the convening of an emergency meeting of the North Atlantic Council to consult the Allies on the growing crisis. "What is happening in Libya is of great concern to all of us. It's a crisis in our immediate neighbourhood. It affects the lives and safety of Libyan civilians and those of thousands of citizens from NATO member states," said Secretary General Rasmussen during a visit to Budapest on February 25.

The next day the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1970, which expressed grave concern over the situation in Libya and imposed an arms embargo on the country.

This political momentum to act increased with every meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). By the end of February, the NATO military staff had already been instructed by the NAC to start prudent planning, based on agreed political guidance. NATO nations also authorized the Supreme Allied Commander Europe to step up Alliance surveillance operations in the Mediterranean. Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft were deployed on March 8 to provide round-the-clock observation of the Northern portion of the Libyan airspace.

On March 10, NATO Defence Ministers met in Brus-

sels and decided to move several Alliance ships off the Libyan coast to boost the monitoring effort. At the same meeting, they agreed on a directive to the military authorities to plan for a possible humanitarian assistance mission and a maritime arms embargo operation.

At the same time, NATO was having regular political consultations with the United Nations, the European Union, the Arab League, the African Union and other key players. But despite international pressure the Qadhafi regime continued its attacks.

The UN Security Council, on March 17, adopted Resolution 1973 in support of the Libyan people. The Resolution introduced active measures including a no-fly zone, and the authorization to member states to use "all necessary measures" to protect Libyan civilians. This was historic. For the first time the UN was putting into practice the responsibility to protect.

A series of meetings of the NAC were called immediately by the NATO Secretary General. He facilitated consensus by keeping the nations informed, with military and political advice from the senior military leadership and the international staff, who were following the events in Libya and consulting NATO's partners in the region. Options were discussed with not only a sense of urgency but also caution given the political and human implications of a possible intervention.

With the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1973, France, the United States and the United Kingdom, both permanent members of the UN Security Council and NATO Allies, took the lead in launching immediate military action outside of the NATO chain of command, with Operation Odyssey Dawn. They commenced strikes on March 17, as NATO drew up plans for its own Alliance operation.

As with any NATO policy or operation, there must be consensus before NATO can act. Discussions between the 28 Allies were intense; some meetings took place at the weekend and lasted well into the late evening. Key questions had to be thrashed out. What could be achieved with the use of force? How far should NATO go in terms of intervention? Would NATO's regional and Arab partners get involved? The senior military leadership was repeatedly asked for their advice.

Recommendations were discussed and options were refined for three main courses of action: the arms embargo, the no-fly zone and the protection of civilians.

Within six days of the UN resolution, the Alliance responded by launching Operation Unified Protector, led by a

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ON TRACK

Canadian commander, Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard, to enforce the arms embargo against Libya. The next day, NATO ships operating in the Mediterranean began making sure that the flow of weapons and mercenaries to Libya by sea was cut off.

Two days later on March 24, NATO increased its effort with a second political decision to enforce the UN-mandated no-fly zone over Libya. The UN resolution banned all flights, except those for humanitarian and aid purposes, in order to ensure that civilians and civilian-populated areas could not be subjected to air attack. NATO aircraft were sent to the region to set up combat air patrols all along the Libyan coast to intercept any aircraft that violated the ban.

The use of air power is never an easy option and this was not an easy decision. It was taken after NATO Allies agreed three basic conditions had been met. There was a demonstrable need, a clear legal mandate, and strong regional support. Militarily the consensus was that a carefully planned and executed air campaign would erode and eventually remove the regime's ability to attack or threaten the people of Libya.

On the March 27, following a very long NAC meeting there was an agreement to add a NATO air campaign to Unified Protector that would take over from Odyssey Dawn. At the same time the Alliance made it very clear that there would be no troops on the ground under NATO command.

Two weeks after the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1973, NATO aircraft took off from their bases in Southern Mediterranean on the morning of March 31 and began striking military forces in Libya that were attacking or threatening civilians.

This intent to use military power was backed up by an increasing political effort, with the creation of an international Contact Group on Libya. The London conference on March 29 brought together more than 40 foreign ministers and representatives from key international and regional organizations, including NATO, to galvanize the political pressure on the regime. The NATO Secretary General said that the creation of an international Contact Group on Libya was "a strong expression of international community support for the Libyan people's wish for freedom, democracy and human rights."

All allies participated directly or indirectly in the operation, as did several of NATO's Arab and regional partners giving the effort a broad support base.

Even before the launch of Operation Unified Protector, NATO initiated a proactive and transparent communications campaign to explain the political rationale for getting involved. Once the operation started, regular briefings were given to the media with daily updates detailing each strike and all relevant political efforts to end the crisis. Hundreds of media queries were answered 24 hours a day, from Brussels and Unified Protector headquarters in Naples, many from journalists who were on the ground in Libya. At the core of all Alliance messaging was the protection of civilians. Special attention was placed on the regional publics and their media, who were a key support base for NATO's actions.

In April, foreign ministers from NATO Allies and non-NATO partners met in Berlin. They committed to using

all necessary resources and operational flexibility to meet the UN mandate until such time that:

- All attacks on civilians and civilian-populated areas were ended;
- The Qadhafi regime withdrew all military and paramilitary forces to bases; and,
- The Qadhafi regime permitted immediate, full, safe and unhindered access to humanitarian aid for the Libyan people.

In June, NATO defence ministers met again in Brussels. They extended the mission a further 90 days and agreed to keep the pressure on the Qadhafi regime for as long as it took to end the crisis.

As the regime started to crumble, NATO ministers encouraged other key organizations, including the United Nations, the European Union, the League of Arab States and the African Union, to start planning for their efforts for an immediate and longer-term post-conflict period.

To many the fighting in the summer appeared to be a stalemate but NATO remained confident that the repeated strikes and the unrelenting international political pressure were increasingly effective. More and more nations around the world began recognizing the Libyan National Transitional Council as the legitimate governing authority. Anti-Qadhafi forces were gaining strength and pushing the regime back.

On August 22, in a statement marking the liberation of Tripoli, Secretary General Rasmussen assured the Libyan people that NATO would continue to protect them so they could decide their future in freedom and in peace. "NATO is ready to work with the Libyan people and with the National Transitional Council, which holds a great responsibility. They must make sure that the transition is smooth and inclusive, that the country stays united, and that the future is founded on reconciliation and respect for human rights."

The UN recognized that the conflict was evolving, when on September 16 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2009 to establish a UN mission in Libya.

By the fall, the regime was splintered and dysfunctional but still able to threaten the people. During the first week of October, NATO defence ministers reaffirmed their commitment to protect the people of Libya for as long as threats persisted, but to end the mission as soon as conditions permitted.

Termination of the operation would be done in coordination with the United Nations and the new Libyan authorities. NATO allies indicated their willingness to support the new Libyan authorities with defence and security sector reforms, upon request.

The fall of Bani Walid and then Sirte, the last strongholds of the regime, and the death of Colonel Qadhafi on October 20, finally put an end to the attacks on civilians. A preliminary decision was taken that week to end operations on October 31.

Secretary General Rasmussen characterized the mission as "one of the most successful in NATO history." The new Libyan authorities praised NATO for taking careful action and saving so many lives. Chairman Abdul Jalil publicly thanked

the Alliance, during the visit of the NATO Secretary General to Tripoli on October 31. "The strikes were accurate so that civilians were not impacted, the people of Libya can testify to this," Chairman Jalil said. The Secretary General responded by congratulating the Libyan people. "At midnight tonight, a successful chapter in NATO's history is coming to an end. But you have already started writing a new chapter in the history of Libya. A new Libya, based on freedom, democracy, human

rights, the rule of law and reconciliation."

At its peak, the mission involved over 8,000 servicemen and women, 20 ships and over 250 aircraft, flying more than 26,500 missions. None of this would have been possible were it not for the political effort both internally and externally that preceded the intervention and which ran concurrently throughout the seven-month operation. ©



Aid, Trade and Votes: Canadian Policies in the Middle East

by Uri Marantz

While acknowledging NATO's engagement in Libya that facilitated the Libyan people's overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi's regime, Uri Marantz looks beyond the immediate events and examines the impact that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict may have on the events that are taking place in other areas of the Middle-East and North Africa and how Canada may or may not exert an influence on those events. He notes the conflicting political objectives that exist among stakeholders – not just Arabs or Palestinians versus Israelis, but between contending Arab states, rival Palestinian factions, competing Israeli political parties, and clashing great power interests.

Arab revolutions and embattled dictatorships have dominated the news emanating from the Middle East in the first half of 2011. Western responses to these events have in turn been cautious, ambivalent, and necessarily contradictory. Canada, for its part briefly engaged in election mode, has given token support to the region's democratic aspirations and material support to the US (United States)-inspired, NATO (North American Treaty Organization)-led, Arab (League of Arab States)-approved and UN (United Nations)-authorized 'humanitarian' operations ostensibly designed to protect civilians but aimed at ousting Colonel Muammar Qaddafi from Libya. While these stories are significant in their own right and merit attention, another significant regional process threatens to overshadow these events and undermine any pro-democracy, anti-authoritarian, freedom-seeking and justice-oriented progress achieved in their name: the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Canada's approach towards the Palestinians and Israelis has been historically supportive of multilateral and UN efforts at conflict resolution and mediation, but two key questions need to be asked of Canada's more general role in the conflict. Firstly, does Canada really matter? Of course, a country that prides itself on democratic institutions and liberal internationalist foreign policies is morally obliged to assist wherever its skills are needed, but this does not imply that a country like Canada would make a substantial difference on the ground if it did – or even if it should. Secondly, and assuming the answer to the first question is

yes, is Canada really helping? Canada has given food aid and foreign assistance to the Palestinians for nearly 20 years and has traded merchandise, goods and services with the Israelis for nearly 60 years, both of which could theoretically be leveraged in pursuit Canada's political and diplomatic goals in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Evaluating Canada's contributions to peace in the Middle East is a lofty task, but determining its effectiveness in terms of its own objectives and outcomes is definitely possible.

The remainder of this article assumes that Canada does in fact matter as a political actor and peace broker in the region (answering yes to the first question) and attempts to explain how Canada really is or is not helping to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (answering the second question). What follows outlines Canada's early role in creating the Palestinian-Israeli situation, an examination of Canada's more recent foreign policy – aid, trade and votes – in the region, and finally, a brief take on current events and what effect Canada's contributions are likely to have in the near future. This final section doubles as a conclusion since it summarizes the more specific points made earlier in the article and applies them to the general realities on the ground.

The Beginning of Canada's Role in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

Canada's involvement in Arab-Israeli (later to be known as Palestinian-Israeli) politics dates back to its membership on the UN Special Committee on Palestine, which was formed in May 1947 and recommended in September of that year the termination of the British Mandate for Palestine and self-determination for the Arab and Jewish communities living in Palestine. This resulted in the well-known UN Partition Plan for Palestine, adopted in the UN General

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Assembly (UNGA) as Resolution 181 in November 1947. As a member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 1948 and 1949, Canada also voted in favour of implementing this resolution while calling for truces, ceasefires and armistice agreements in the Arab-Israeli war that followed. Canada officially recognized Israel in December 1948 and voted in the UNSC to admit the Jewish state into the UN in March 1949. Canada was present in the early years of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and active in international diplomatic forums.

In 1949 the UN Reliefs and Works Agency (UNRWA) was created, an organization supported by Canada, tasked with providing basic health, relief, education and social services to displaced Palestinian refugees and whose first Director was Howard Kennedy, a former major-general in the Canadian Army and Quartermaster General in the Second World War.¹ UNRWA was originally meant to be temporary, existing only insofar as a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict could be found. In the absence of any such solution, the UNGA has repeatedly voted to extend its mandate, which began with nearly 750,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Gaza and the West Bank in 1949 but has swelled to almost 5 million today, an unsustainable state of affairs sorely stretching aid budgets and weakening donor resolve.² From the beginning, Canada played a pivotal role in the birth of Israel and the Palestinian question.

Aid, Trade and Votes

Canadian bilateral food aid and foreign assistance to the Palestinian Authority (PA) has skyrocketed in recent years, from \$1 million in 2003 to \$68 million in 2010 according to the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).³ Despite this exponential increase in Canadian aid, four major problems persist in its disbursement, though others no doubt exist. Firstly, Palestinian agencies have been dogged by accountability, corruption, transparency and effectiveness issues for decades.⁴ Secondly, much of this foreign aid is destined for UNRWA, an inherently temporary organization, and not for permanent governance, infrastructure and institutional needs at the national level, a situation that exacerbates Palestinian dependence on international assistance. Thirdly, the majority of Palestinian projects undertaken by CIDA are of an emergency and humanitarian nature, again pointing to the temporary, inefficient and *ad hoc* qualities of foreign aid. Fourthly, conflicting political objectives exist among stakeholders – not just Arabs or Palestinians versus Israelis, but between contending Arab states, rival Palestinian factions, competing Israeli political parties, clashing great power interests, and so on. All this demonstrates that Canadian foreign aid objectives are far from straightforward – or even doable.

Although Canada gives no foreign aid to Israel, the two countries do trade; conversely, Canadians and Palestinians do not trade, but the aid relationship does exist. Bilateral Canadian-Israeli trade flows have increased modestly over the years, from \$0.25 billion in 1988 to a peak of \$1.8 billion in 2008.⁵ No doubt these figures have been bolstered by the Canada-Israel Free Trade Agreement, which

came into effect in 1997. Clearly, then, both Canadian foreign aid to Palestine and Canada's international trade with Israel have risen over the past decade (or two).⁶ Disregarding the tendency for non-inflation adjusted dollars to rise in relative terms over time, what accounts for the real increase in value of these figures?

Canada's votes in the UNSC, UNGA, UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), and UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) may help to answer this question.⁷ As a member of the UNSC for two years every decade from 1945 to 2000, Canada has followed the great powers' lead and consistently supported Palestinian interests. In the UNGA, of which every country is a member, Canadian support for Palestine only eroded in 2006 when the Progressive Conservative's more ideologically pro-Israeli minority government assumed power.⁸ The now-disgraced UNCHR was decommissioned for a variety of reasons, one of them being its notoriously anti-Israeli bias, so Canada predictably voted in favour of Palestinian interests in that forum. In contrast, the successor to the UNCHR, the UNHRC, has seen Canada take an ideologically principled stand in favour of Israeli interests – ever since the new government came to power in 2006.

The most probable explanation seems to be that the foreign aid and foreign policy bureaucracies are acting out of sync with each other...

What these findings show is virtually unconditional support on Canada's part for Israeli policies post-2006. This should not surprise anybody following domestic politics in Canada, though it does pose a paradox for the aid and trade statistics. If Canadian foreign policy has taken a pro-Israeli turn in the past few years, then increased Canadian-Israeli trade is to be expected. What about increased foreign aid to the Palestinians? In the world of international politics, often described as a zero-sum game, this outcome is unexpected. The most probable explanation seems to be that the foreign aid and foreign policy bureaucracies are acting out of sync with each other, in contradictory and counterproductive ways. This would mean that in the case of Palestinian-Israeli politics, Canadian foreign aid and foreign policy may both achieve their particular objectives, but the broader outcomes seem to be uncorrelated with any specific Canadian policies or strategies. In other words, Canada's Middle East policies are ineffective.

Current Events and Canadian Contributions

In September 2011, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas formally submitted a request to join the UN as a full member state. The Israelis have vehemently opposed such a move, insisting that mutually agreeable negotiations can be the only substitution for such unilateral declarations. The Palestinians have in turn responded that negotiations will resume as soon as the Israelis cease building more settlements, and so the blame games, circles of mutual recrimination and abdications of responsibility spiral endlessly out of control.

This is of course oversimplified, but a stalemate has no doubt resulted.

Canada has a unique opportunity to bring some much-needed diplomatic credibility to the Palestinians and Israelis and restore a sense of multilateralism and

compromise to the conflict. In this time of uncertainty and instability, as revolutions change the very nature of the regional landscape, Canada should seize the moment and lead by its historically enlightened example.

(Endnotes)

- 1 See Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), "Support to Palestinian Refugees," November 23, 2009, <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/acdi-cida.nsf/eng/ANN-519144910-Q3S> (accessed June 2, 2011).
- 2 See the UN Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), "About UNRWA," June 1, 2011, <http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=47> (accessed June 2, 2011).
- 3 These funds were briefly frozen after Hamas – a radical, Islamist Palestinian movement designated as a terrorist organization by Canada and many other Western governments – won legislative elections in 2006, but this same assistance was eventually rerouted to the PA under the control of Fatah – a moderate, secular Palestinian party. See Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), "Project Browser: West Bank and Gaza, CIDA-Funded Projects," June 1, 2011, <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb/cpo.nsf/fWebCSAZEn?ReadForm&idx=00&CC=PS> (accessed June 2, 2011).
- 4 The reasons for these accountability, corruption, transparency and effectiveness issues are too numerous and too complicated to entertain in an article of this length, but they remain enormous obstacles for foreign aid donors.
- 5 See Statistics Canada, "Canadian International Merchandise Trade Database," June 1, 2011, http://cansim2.statcan.gc.ca/cgi-win/CNSMCGI.PGM?Lang=E&CIMT_Action=Sections&ResultTemplate=CII_CIMT5 (accessed June 2, 2011).
- 6 Although Canadian trade with Israel is much bigger than Palestinian foreign aid in absolute terms (\$1.8 billion in 2008 versus \$68 million in 2010), Canadian aid to Palestine is rising much more quickly in relative terms (by a factor of 68 in 7 years – \$68 million in 2010 instead of \$1 million in 2003 – versus by a factor of 7.2 in 20 years – \$1.8 billion in 2008 instead of \$0.25 billion in 1988).
- 7 It is important to note at this point the nearly universal tendency for United Nations resolutions post-1967 to be inherently pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli in nature. Though this may seem to be a boldfaced conclusion, it stems from two basic premises. The first is that Palestine is not an official member-state of the UN, so it cannot legally or even technically be censured within the UN interstate system, and the second is the political earthquake that rocked the Arab-Israeli *status quo* after 1967. As Israel captured territory belonging to Egypt, Jordan and Syria, it came to be perceived as an occupier of 'Palestinian' lands (though why Arab states could not have occupied lands belonging to their fellow Palestinian prior to 1967 remains a mystery). Therefore, virtually all resolutions passed in the UN after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war are informed by a zero-sum logic of pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli parameters. See Canada-Israel Committee, "Canada's Votes at the UN, Voting Records," June 1, 2011, <http://www.cicweb.ca/voteatun/> (accessed June 2, 2011).
- 8 Canadian support for Israel is characterized by unprecedented levels of 'No' votes on one-sidedly anti-Israeli resolutions. The question of how to count the 'Abstain' votes is a relevant one, but for the purposes of this article, can safely be avoided by merely comparing the 'Yes' and 'No' votes and ignoring the 'Abstain' ones.



Shipwreck or Lifeboat? NATO in a Stormy Century

by Richard Cohen

Richard Cohen posits that NATO's Article 5 has become, for the moment at least, a less important motivating factor in NATO's day to day existence. He sees the varying degrees of national commitment to particular non-article 5 operations amongst the nations as natural and a welcome sign of NATO's flexibility and maturity.

The Trouble with NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation benefits and suffers the best and worst characteristics of multi-lateral organisations. On the one hand NATO enjoys the synergies of international political solidarity and merged military strength but on the other, it suffers from the 'negative synergy' of divergent

interests, individual national weaknesses and ongoing and ever-changing disagreements amongst its members. Historically, multilateral institutions have only survived so long as their positive synergies outweigh the negative ones.

Whither NATO?

Since its inception in 1949, skeptics have zeroed in on the NATO's difficulties and weaknesses. In 1952, the North Atlantic Council meeting in Lisbon under the chairmanship of 'Mr. L.B. Pearson,' agreed on a target of forty-two ready divisions and forty-eight reserve divisions by the end of that year; these numbers represented a near doubling of NATO's available military ground strength. In the years that followed NATO nations never came close achieving this goal and the Alliance and its members were ridiculed for renegeing on promises and for raising unrealistic expectations. Throughout its 60-plus year history, NATO nations have quarreled over a myriad of issues including the role of nucle-

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ar weapons, relations with the Soviet Union, missile deployments, the Greek-Turkish dispute, the role of France, NATO enlargement, the Iraq war and not least, national troop contributions, including endless debates over 'burden-sharing.' On the positive side, NATO provided a safe and predictable venue for these kinds of debates. But historically the Alliance has never been the confident and unified organisation that some people nostalgically look back upon today.

Despite these difficulties, almost everyone would agree that NATO's role as a strong political and military bridge between Europe and North America during the years of confrontation with the Soviet Union was indispensable. The Alliance maintained the peace in Europe and by extension, stability in much of the world.

After the Cold War

NATO's achievements since the end of the Cold War have arguably been amongst its most impressive. Despite predictions of its early demise, NATO was able to successfully transform itself, at least in part, into a more activist and outward-looking body. In tandem with the European Union, it played a key role in shaping a free and democratic Europe from the jumbled pieces of the disintegrated Soviet bloc. The 'peace dividend' triggered significant reductions in defence budgets across the Alliance but NATO was still able to effectively respond to crises in Bosnia, Kosovo, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan and Libya. Historically a strictly transatlantic partnership, with an almost exclusive focus on Europe, NATO has today become one of the major players on the world stage.

The Alliance's highly innovative Partnership for Peace program created an effective political and military framework within which the newly independent states of the former Soviet bloc could move step by step toward integration with the transatlantic family of nations. In more recent years, the Alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue has become a valuable tool for regular political and military contacts and cooperation with important North African and Middle Eastern states, including Israel. In addition, the war in Afghanistan created strong partnerships with Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Korea. Despite the sometimes maddening requirement for consensus across 28 nations, NATO's role in the fight against terrorism, its civil emergency response cooperation, NBC defence arrangements, cyber collaboration and most recently ballistic missile defence are evidence of broad success in the Alliance's efforts to keep pace with a fast changing security environment.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan is by far NATO's most ambitious political and military campaign since the end of the Cold War. The ISAF operation, half way around the world from NATO's traditional area of operations, came about by a merging of two of the Alliance's core missions; the 'Article V' response to the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 and NATO's much more recent 'out of area' role.

Despite its origins, Afghanistan is not an Article 5

'life or death' mission; for NATO it's an out-of-area operation of choice. The fact that all NATO members and many international partners, have contributed to the mission is an indication of how far Alliance's Eurocentric culture has shifted since the fall of the Soviet Union. In this kind of operation it shouldn't surprise anyone that each country has its own approach; some like the US, UK, Denmark and Canada have engaged in full combat without 'caveats' while others, like the Germans, have tried their best to avoid fighting. But criticism of Germany over these constraints is not entirely fair; we have to remember that the Germans have come a very long way in allowing their troops to be sent into harm's way anywhere outside the NATO area. Germany and other NATO forces in the 'quieter' areas of Afghanistan also play a very valuable role in the Alliance effort.

Complaints from the 'core' contributors in Afghanistan that only a few nations are shouldering the burden misses the point. It's remarkable that so many nations have stayed the course for so long, a long way from NATO territory and with little public support. The fact that partners like Australia, New Zealand, Ukraine, the UAE, and others continue to march together under the NATO flag is impressive testimony to the value of Alliance's role in this kind of operation. How many nations, NATO or non-NATO, would be in Afghanistan today in an ad hoc US-led coalition?

Finally, critics argue that the Alliance is fighting a war in Afghanistan that it can't win. The ultimate outcome in Afghanistan will almost certainly not live up to our original expectations. In the longer term, even if NATO achieves only minimal success, the operation could still have value in itself. The skills and experience the Alliance developed in conducting a complex 'whole of government' operation in a far flung theatre could be very useful for future Alliance missions. Indeed, many of the political and military lessons learned in Afghanistan helped to shape the NATO mission in Libya.

Libya

The Libyan operation was a major military and political success for the Alliance. It also marked an important turning point in NATO history. For the first time, Europeans and Canadians, not the US, took the political and military lead in a NATO campaign. Under the Secretary General's leadership and the political guidance of the North Atlantic Council the NATO command structure was able to act in a surprisingly smooth and effective way, clear evidence of NATO's new political and military agility in the conduct complex combat operations at almost no notice.

It's true that only a small number of NATO nations actually fought in the front line of the Libyan operation and this time Germany can rightly be criticised for its rather odd refusal to actively support the campaign. But those countries, like Germany, that didn't participate in the fighting still allowed consensus, probably signalling a new approach to NATO non-Article 5 operations. In future, 'coalitions of the willing' operating within Alliance command structure may become the norm for expeditionary operations. This should be seen as a perfectly normal and pragmatic development in NATO's continuing evolution.

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Canada and NATO

'Ambiguity' is perhaps the best word to describe Canada's approach to NATO today. For years this country was one of NATO's strongest advocates. But as the Cold War drew to a close, financial and political pressures combined with indifferent political and public support, meant that Canada led 'the rush to the door.' In a very short time we withdrew our troops from Europe and slashed our defence spending and our once robust military capabilities.

Today, despite a more robust foreign policy, renewed government and public support for the armed forces and a relatively healthy economic position, Canada spends only about 1.5% of its GDP on defence, below even the sorry European average of 1.7% and well below the US (5.4%), the UK (2.7%) and France (2.0%).

Even within the leadership of the Canadian Forces, there is scepticism about NATO. Recent government decisions to terminate Canada's longstanding role in the NATO AWACS force (which played a key role in the air campaign over Libya) and to opt out of the important Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS) project risked damaging Alliance solidarity in order to save relatively small amounts of money that weren't going directly to support Canada's own armed forces.

And yet, at some level, even the most sceptical Canadian politicians and soldiers know that NATO remains an indispensable element of Canada's security. No other defence arrangement links Canada to our European friends. Europe needs Canada and Canada may need Europe in the years to

come. As the Arctic becomes a focus for international competition from countries like Russia, China and others, Canada may well need the political and possibly the military support of its NATO allies.

A 'Hollow Shell'?

In these difficult economic times troubles lie ahead for the Alliance. Secretary General Rasmussen has pointed out that "At the current pace of cuts, it is hard to see how Europe could maintain enough military capabilities to sustain similar operations (to Libya) in the future." Even the United States, the bedrock of NATO military strength for over 60 years, will soon be forced to make major reductions in defence capabilities.

However, it's important to remember that NATO has been here many times before. Arguments about levels of defence spending and capabilities have plagued the Alliance since its inception. Sooner or later, better economic times and/or a serious international crisis will reverse the current slide in capabilities. Of course, reconstituting military capability is not something that can be done overnight. The challenge for the Alliance and its members will be to retain enough hard core capacity to face the new asymmetric threats as well as the more traditional dangers such as the growing power of China, Russia, Iran and others.

Secretary General Rasmussen's claim that "...the transatlantic partnership remains the main engine of global security..." may be even truer today than it was in 1949. Canada and its NATO allies forget this at their peril.



Does Canada Still Need NATO?

by J.L. Granatstein

Dr. Granatstein notes that NATO has been important to Canada and to the world, and asks what has NATO done for Canada lately. What he is looking for now is a clear-headed analysis of Canada's defence and foreign policy requirements, a sweeping review of where our interests lie, today, and where they will need to be protected over the next 20 or 50 years

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been important to Canada and to the world. The Alliance stabilized Western Europe at the onset of the Cold War and, with the Marshall Plan, galvanized the democracies to resist Soviet expansionism. And four decades after its creation, NATO effectively presided over the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite states, a decisive victory without a shot being fired. Canada, like the rest of the world, benefited greatly from this.

But what has NATO done for Canada lately? It may seem crass to ask such a hard-hearted question, but nations do have interests, not friends. NATO formed the guts of the coalition that waged the first Gulf War, although Canada contributed very little to this effort. Its members provided almost all the forces that undertook operations in Former Yugoslavia. And then in its first out-of-area operation, NATO provided the command and control and most of the forces for the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Most recently, of course, NATO brought down the Gaddafi regime in Libya. Canada participated in all of these operations, providing relatively small numbers of highly effective troops and capabilities.

But these operations, especially those in Afghanistan and Libya, dramatically revealed the weaknesses of NATO. In the first place, not all members participated, some declining to do so, others binding their forces with caveats that sharply limited what they would do. The Canadian Forces in Kandahar, in particular, complained about their inability to get assistance from NATO allies because of home government constraints on where and how their troops might deploy. Second, the standard of training and equipment varied, sometimes dramatically. Of the aircraft flying over Libya once the US Air Force withdrew into the background, only the Danish fighters had the essential bunker buster bombs. Third, the United States, the driving force in Afghanistan, shared key intelligence with Britain and Canada, but not its other partners, a policy that created serious disagreements and limited operational effectiveness. In other words, despite the Alliance existing for more than six decades, its members' training, policies and procedures left much to be desired. The impact of defence cutbacks on each and every member of NATO in the next several years will only worsen matters. So too will growing American isolationism¹ and Washington's (and Ottawa's) wholly justifiable belief that Europe should now be capable of defending itself. The Americans will not

continue to pay three-quarters of NATO's costs much longer.

So what should Canada do? We stationed forces in Europe for more than forty years and trained and equipped our military to fight a war on and over European soil and the North Atlantic. We did this because of our history, because Britain and France are our Mother Countries, because Europe is our heritage, and because our trade with the European Union matters to us. NATO expansion eastward after the collapse of the Soviet Union was seen as inevitable, but it did raise new questions. Canada was prepared to help defend Britain, France and Germany, but was it ready to fight to save Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria? Should it have been?

Making such questions harder still, Canadians understood, even if they only rarely said so, that the NATO commitment was *de facto* one-way only—that Canada had committed itself to defend its overseas partners, but their commitment to defend us scarcely existed as anything more than an unlikely hypothetical. Yes, after the events of 9/11 NATO invoked Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty because the United States was attacked (the idea of doing so being raised initially by the Canadian Ambassador to the Alliance), but that was the United States. Would Article V have been put into effect if Al Qaeda terrorists had attacked Toronto or Vancouver? Perhaps, but no one could credibly say so with certainty. When Charles de Gaulle was stoking discontent in Quebec and in francophone communities in New Brunswick and Manitoba in the late 1960s and seriously threatening Canada's domestic tranquillity (to cite one example of Alliance disinterest) NATO turned its back, not a single member even urging France to desist.²

The one-way street matters still. The Arctic, many believe, might become a theatre of conflict as the ice melts, shipping increases, and resources, hitherto inaccessible, become open to exploitation. Some suggest that NATO could help Canada if military assistance became necessary against a newly aggressive Russia. Certainly Moscow has interests in the north and will seek to control resources just as much as Beijing. But for the moment, the chief contenders for influence and control in the Arctic Ocean seem to be the Americans and the countries of the European Union or, in other words, our friends in NATO. On what grounds could anyone credibly assume that NATO will stand by Canada in any future struggle in the north? Or is it more likely that a mad scramble for control will result, pitting each against all? And where would such a scramble leave Canada? In the cold soup—in all likelihood—as interests are always more important than friendship.

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Now it may be that NATO still serves Canada's national interests. The Europeans are our friends, our trading partners, and the countries from which the population and beliefs of the old Canada derived. But the new Canada increasingly looks west across the Pacific or south to Latin and South America. The Canadian population has altered dramatically and will continue to do so, and trading patterns may change as well. What we need now is a clear-headed analysis of Canada's defence and foreign policy requirements,

(Endnotes)

1 A poll presented at the Halifax International Security Forum (18-20 November 2011) found that the United States had become the most inward-looking nation of the 24 countries surveyed, with 90 percent of Americans saying the United States should focus on problems at home.

2 At least that was the conclusion that Robert Bothwell and I reached after interviewing many European diplomats in Canada and Western Europe during our research for *Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto, 1990). ©



Canada and the UN Security Council: Why the Loss?

by: Louis Delvoie

Retired Canadian diplomat Louis Delvoie asks the question: why did Canada lose out to Portugal in its most recent bid for a seat on the UN Security Council? His response to the question dwells on Canada's image and reputation, on foreign policy choices made by the Canadian government and on a significant geo-political reality

Canada's failure to obtain a rotating seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council at the end of 2010 provoked a fair amount of hand wringing in this country, particularly on the part of the media. The failure was all the more galling in that Canada lost out to Portugal, a country that normally should have had three strikes against it in any such contest. First, Portugal is a small European country with a totally indifferent record as an actor in UN affairs. Second, it should have enjoyed no particular support among countries in the developing world because of its unenviable history as a colonial power in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Third, it was on the verge of financial collapse. And yet Portugal won and Canada lost. Why?

The answer to this question provided at the time by the media and the commentariat were largely superficial and predictable. Left-wing and left-of-centre commentators bemoaned Canada's loss of status and stature in the world and laid the blame squarely at the door of the Harper government. Right-wing and right-of-centre commentators blamed a feckless UN organization and suggested that a Security Council seat was worthless anyway.

The real answer to the question is a little more complicated and deserving of somewhat more systematic analysis. It falls into the realms of image and reputation, foreign policy options and choices, and geo-political realities.

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a sweeping review of where our interests lie today and where they will need to be protected in the next twenty or fifty years. Any such review must surely continue to give primacy to Canada's alliance with the United States, and if an honest review concludes that NATO remains a necessity for us, no one should be very unhappy. But in the absence of fresh thinking and in the presence of new realities, a reliance on clichés about the great virtues of an alliance that may have outlived its usefulness cannot be permitted to stand.

Peacekeeping

For over four decades Canada's excellent reputation and image at the UN rested largely on its contributions to UN peacekeeping operations. Along with the Scandinavian countries, Canada was one of the unchallenged leaders in the field. Successive Secretaries-General invariably turned to Canada for troops, observers, and leaders whenever a new UN operation was to be mounted. Canadian political leaders such as Lester Pearson, Howard Green and Paul Martin Sr. were seen as stalwart supporters of the UN's endeavours. And Canadian generals such as E.L.M. Burns, Bruce MacDonald, Lewis MacKenzie and Romeo Dallaire acquitted themselves with great distinction in their service with the organization.

But all of that is a story of yesteryear. Today Canada and the Scandinavian countries have been totally displaced as the leading contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. Now that distinction belongs to Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Egypt and Nigeria (of wealthy developed countries, only Italy, France and Spain now rank among the top 20 troop contributing countries). With less than 100 military personnel serving with the UN, Canada now ranks behind Mongolia as a contributor.

That state of affairs is in many ways understandable. Unhappy experiences in the UN missions in Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda left a distinctly sour taste in the mouths of many Canadians. Higher priority missions mounted by NATO, particularly in Afghanistan, were sufficient to stretch Canada's limited military resources. The vast majority of UN peacekeepers are now deployed in sub-Saharan Africa, a region in which Canada has only very limited national interests. But while all of this may well explain the paucity of

Canada's current involvement in UN operations, it does not alter the fact that it has detracted from Canada's image and reputation at the UN.

Development Assistance

If that image and reputation rested in good part on peacekeeping, it also owed something to Canada's role as a generous provider of development assistance to developing and underdeveloped states. Through its involvement in the Colombo Plan of 1950, Canada was in the vanguard of this endeavour. Its aid programmes moved on steadily from Asia to Africa to Latin America and finally to the Middle East. More than 115 developing countries eventually came to benefit from Canadian aid.

In 1970 a commission chaired by former Prime Minister Lester Pearson proposed that developed countries should devote 0.7 percent of GNP to development assistance to the developing world. Subsequent international commissions endorsed that target. Canada never managed to reach that target, but during the 1970s and 1980s it did get as high as 0.55 per cent of GNP. That in itself was sufficient to place Canada in the top half of aid donating countries and to solidify its reputation as a generous country. That situation was, however, to change rather dramatically in the 1990s. Faced with severe budgetary deficits and a growing national debt, the Canadian government cut back its aid budget to the point that it represented only 0.25 per cent of GNP. This led Canada to fall into the bottom half of aid donating countries.

The return to balanced and then surplus budgets in the early years of the last decade did not lead to a significant increase in Canada's aid expenditures, which today represent only 0.3 per cent of GNP. This relative decrease in resource allocations has been accompanied by another negative phenomenon. That is the worsening reputation of the Canadian International Development Agency, which was recently the target of a scathing report prepared by a committee of the Canadian Senate. Taken together, these realities are unlikely to enhance Canada's image in an organization such as the UN, the vast majority of whose members are developing countries.

Africa

There are also two sets of policy decisions taken by the Harper government that must be factored into this equation. The first concerns Africa.

Africa occupied a relatively high priority position in the foreign policy agendas of both the Chretien and Martin governments. Within the context of the G-7, Prime Minister Chretien was instrumental in launching the New Economic Partnership for Africa. Prime Minister Martin in turn promised to double Canada's aid to Africa. In a document accompanying its international policy statement of 2005, the Martin government identified 25 developing nations for special concentration in Canada's bilateral aid programme. Of these, 15 were African countries.

The Harper government produced in February 2009

a somewhat similar list of 20 countries of concentration for Canadian bilateral aid. The important difference was that only seven of the countries listed were African while the number of Latin American countries had grown from four to six. This shift is indicative of the Harper government's far greater interest in Latin America than in Africa, a trend evident in its deployment of both its aid and diplomatic resources. While this shift may be fully justified on the basis of a hard-nosed assessment of Canada's national interests, it is one that has not gone unnoticed in Africa. This in turn means that the voting bloc of some 50 member states of the African Union was probably less likely to be supportive of Canada's candidacy for a Security Council seat in 2010 than it would have been in the past.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict

Another relevant issue is the Harper government's approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which constitutes a notable departure from the policy and practice of previous Canadian governments.

Traditionally the Canadian government policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict has been notable for two features: 1) strong support for Israel's right to exist within secure and recognized borders, and 2) a commitment to "balance and objectivity" in dealing with individual episodes or events in the conflict. The Harper government has totally abandoned the second aspect of this policy as became very evident during Israel's military operations in Lebanon in 2006 and in Gaza in 2009. It has adopted a position of complete and unqualified support for Israel, regardless of events or circumstances. In so doing, it has often parted company with its major Western allies, including the United States.

This tilt in Canadian policy has certainly not gone unnoticed in the Arab world and in the Muslim world more generally. In the UN General Assembly the Arab countries command 22 votes (the membership of the Arab League) and the Muslim countries 53 votes (the membership of the Organization of the Islamic Conference). The alienation of such large blocs also probably goes a long way toward explaining why Canada did not obtain the votes necessary to secure a Security Council seat.

Regionalism

Finally there is a geo-political factor that must be taken into consideration when assessing the reasons for Canada's disappointing defeat at the UN.

The noted American strategic thinker Hermann Kahn is reported to have said that, "Canada is a regional power without a region." There is a profound truth in this remark, which bears pondering whenever it is necessary to assess Canada's relative weight in the world. The geographic reality is that Canada is to some extent isolated in North America with only one neighbour, which happens to be the world's sole superpower. Canada does not belong to any regional organization of like-minded countries that aspires

CANADA AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
-EDITOR'S NOTE

In 2011, the UN Security Council convened over 200 times to consider matters of international peace and security and passed more than 50 resolutions authorizing measures up to and including the use of military force. The agenda included Afghanistan, Libya, Sudan and the Middle East; the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea; international terrorism; and the tribunals prosecuting war crimes in Rwanda and Yugoslavia.

Canada was little involved in these decisions, for in the fall of 2010 it had failed to win election to one of the ten non-permanent (two-year) seats on the Security Council. As a result, Canada played only a minor role in the Council's deliberations on Afghanistan where 3000 Canadian Forces personnel were then serving and more than 150 had died; and it exercised little influence in setting the objectives and terms of engagement of the UN's intervention in Libya in which Canada ended up being a major participant.

Did it matter that Canada was not on the Council? A negative answer implies Canada need not aspire to international leadership; it is sufficient we be good followers of others' decisions. But if the answer is yes, we should explore what lay behind our lost vote. One of the winners (Germany) demonstrated its "international leadership" by abstaining on the Council resolution authorizing action against Libya, while the other (Portugal) sought a \$100 billion bailout package from the EU. The articles which follow offer two very different explanations of why Canada is not on the UN Security Council today.

to developing a common foreign policy, for example the European Union (EU) or the Association of South East Asian Nations. Thus, unlike many other countries, Canada cannot count on a "bank" of votes when pursuing certain objectives in international organizations.

Portugal, on the other hand, is a fairly long-standing member of the EU. In putting forward its candidacy for a Security Council seat, it could reasonably expect to receive the support of most, if not all, of the 27 member states of the European Union. This too goes some way towards explaining why Portugal won and Canada lost.

Conclusion

The various factors discussed above were presumably known to Canadian politicians and diplomats before the decision was made to seek a UN Security Council seat. Given that the deck was so evidently stacked against Canada, why did they proceed anyway? Was it a failure of analysis or failure to draw the right conclusions from the analysis? One can only hope that they will do better in future, thus sparing Canada any further humiliation on the international scene. ©



Canada and the UN Security Council: What were they thinking?

by Paul Chapin

Last fall, Canada lost a bid to serve on the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Many considered it a national humiliation, which they laid at the feet of the Conservative government. Critics claimed that the government's foreign policy had ruined Canada's international reputation and we paid the price. The sub-text was that Canadian foreign policy should revert to what it had been under Liberal governments.

This article takes a different view. The failure was not one of foreign policy but of diplomacy. Canada should never have found itself in a crass popularity contest against two European allies for the support of the motley collection of states represented in the UN General Assembly. There is a better way to secure a seat on the Security Council. Proceeding with our candidacy as we did was reckless.

A failure of foreign policy?

A common lament was that Canada's reputation was built on peacekeeping and that the government had forsaken this role to the point where Canada now ranks far down the list of contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. None of this is true. Canada's reputation does not stand or

fall on how many peacekeepers it deploys. If this were the standard, we should all strive to match Bangladesh's contribution of 10,500. The Canadian Forces have maintained a high operational tempo since the early 1990s and virtually all operations have been UN-led or UN-mandated. One kind is not more "real" or "legitimate" than the other. But like almost all of our allies, Canada's focus recently has been on the difficult and costly UN enforcement actions in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Libya. In 2008, Canada ranked 15th among troop- and police- contributing countries and 8th in financial support.

A second complaint was that Canadian aid had declined, especially to Africa. In fact, the numbers indicate Canada's Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget is twice what it was in 2004.

Paul Chapin is a 25-year veteran of the Canadian Foreign Service and has served at NATO as the Canadian representative on the Political Advisors Committee. From 2003 to 2006, he was DC for International Security at the DFAIT in Ottawa, responsible inter alia for the operations of the Canadian delegation to NATO, Canada's engagement in Afghanistan, and security and defence relations with the US. He is a Member of the Board of Directors of the CDA Institute.

ON TRACK

The numbers also tell us that Africa remains by far the single largest recipient of Canadian aid. Canadian aid to sub-Saharan Africa averaged more than \$1 billion a year over the last five years. It is true that CIDA has sought periodically to reduce the number of countries receiving aid – and did so again recently. OECD figures indicate only six countries gave Africa more aid in 2009 than Canada: the US, France, UK, Germany, Japan and Spain.

Year	Total ODA	% of GNI
2001	1.532	0.22
2002	2.004	0.28
2003	2.030	0.24
2004	2.599	0.27
2005	3.756	0.34
2006	3.683	0.29
2007	4.079	0.29
2008	4.794	0.33
2009	4.000	0.30
2010	5.131	0.33

**Canada's Official Development Assistance
C\$ billion**

A third charge is that the government departed from Canada's traditionally "even-handed" approach to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and offered "complete and unqualified support" for Israel, thereby alienating Arab and Muslim countries. Neither premise is well founded. Canada has never been even-handed between Israel and those who would destroy it. Canada voted for the partition of Palestine in 1947 as "the least objectionable" alternative; we were among the first to recognize the state of Israel in 1948; and, ever after this opposed "any attempt to challenge the right of Israel or the right of any other state in the region to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threat and acts of force" (Allan J. MacEachen, 1974). This is hardly tantamount to "complete and unqualified support" for whatever policies Israel might adopt. Canadian governments have typically been very circumspect in adjusting to the many strategic and tactical shifts made by Israeli governments.

Most Arab states do not want Canada to be neutral between Israel and Hamas and Hezbollah. Nor should Canada be. If that means fewer votes in the General Assembly, it is a price worth paying.

The failure of diplomacy

In the 2010 election, three countries competed for the two "Western" seats on the Security Council. Germany received the minimum two-thirds support of those present and voting to win a seat on the first ballot, leaving Portugal and Canada to compete for the remaining seat. When neither received two-thirds support on the second ballot, a third was called. Since the Canadian number had dropped precipitously, Canada withdrew as the third ballot got under way. The failure was avoidable. But it takes a little history to explain why.

When the UN Charter was being drawn up, Canada faced a dilemma. The so-called "great powers" were making arrangements for two classes of

Rounds	Germany	Portugal	Canada
Round One	128	122	114
Round Two	---	113	78
Round Three	---	150*	32*

Balloting For the Western European and Other Seats in 2012
**these numbers are not complete as Canada withdrew its candidacy as the third ballot got underway*

UN members: those who would be accorded permanent seats on the powerful Security Council and an unlimited right to veto any decision - and everyone else. Lesser states would fill two-year terms on the Council on a rotating basis but without the right to veto.

Canada had to settle for assurances that the non-permanent members of the Council would be elected with "due regard" to their contribution to international peace and security. Not a great outcome, but it did translate into Canada being elected every ten years or so: 1948-1949, 1958-1959, 1967-1968, 1977-1978, 1989-1990, and 1999-2000. Why not 2011-2012? Was Canada no longer owed "due regard" for its contribution to international peace and security? Had Canada's contribution declined so much? No objective measure would support such a conclusion. But if Canada lost because arguments in Ottawa were heard in New York, why had Canadian diplomats proceeded with such a risky venture? The answer for which I argue is that they had not been studying group dynamics.

The regional groupings

In the early 1960s, UN member states began to form regional groups to pursue common fronts on political issues and share in the distribution of influential and often lucrative UN posts. Their composition evolved over time. Today, there are five regional groupings each assigned a specific number of non-permanent seats on the Security Council.

The UN Charter stipulates there should be equitable geographic distribution in the election of non-permanent members of the Council, but establishes no procedures for how the regional groups should select their candidates. In 2010 for example, South Africa ran uncontested for the African seat being vacated by Uganda. So did India for the Asian seat held by Japan, and Colombia for the Latin American and Caribbean seat held by Mexico. Meanwhile, three members of the Western European and Other Group (WEOG) were competing for two seats, spending millions on "campaigns."

The WEOG

When the British Commonwealth Group disappeared in the mid-1960s, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (CANZ) became "the others" in the WEOG.

The arrangement worked well for a long time. Over 35 years, there was sufficient cooperation within WEOG that the longest period without one of the three CANZ countries

**The Ottawa Conference on
Defence and Security**

23-24 February 2012

**Fairmont Château Laurier Hotel
Ottawa ON**

The Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security, on 23 February, 0900 - 1700 hrs, “**Canada and the World**”. Participants will include the Hon. John Baird (invited), Dr. Uzi Arad, U.S. Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus, Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard, Rear-Admiral (Ret’d) Tyrone Pile, Dr. Jim Boutilier, Dr. John Blaxland, Captain (N) Raul Pedrozo, Ferry de Kerckhove, Dr. Ann Fitz-Gerald, Reuel Marc Gercht, Dr. Kawaz Gerges, David Collyer, David McLaughlin, and Jeffrey Schott.

On 24 February, 0830 - 1645 hrs, “**The Canadian Forces - Capabilities Required for Home and Away**”. Participants will include the Hon. Peter MacKay (invited), General Walter Natynczyk, General Sir David Richards, General James Mattis, Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) Michel Maisonneuve, Vice-Admiral Paul Maddison, Lieutenant-General Peter Devlin, Lieutenant-General André Deschamps, Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) Michel Gauthier, Lieutenant-General Stuart Beare, and Lieutenant-General Walter Semianiw.

Registration Fees (includes reception 23 February):

- CDA Institute donors, seminar Sponsors, CDA Member Associations and Associate Associations \$200
- full-time students ((captain/lieutenant(N) and below)) \$50
- all others. \$275
- luncheon - 23 February \$40
- mess dinner - 24 February \$90

Enquiries and individual registration online by 20 February, at <https://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai>

**La conférence d’Ottawa sur
la Sécurité et la défense**

les 23-24 février 2012

**Fairmont Château Laurier Hotel
à Ottawa ON**

La conférence d’Ottawa [2012] sur la Sécurité et la défense, le 23 février, 9 h - 17 h, « **Le Canada et le monde** ». L’hon. John Baird (invité), M. Uzi Arad, la Secrétaire de la Marine américaine Ray Mabus, le Lieutenant-général Charles Bouchard, le Contre-amiral (ret) Tyrone Pile, M. Jim Boutilier, M. John Blaxland, le Capitaine de vaisseau Raul Pedrozo, Ferry de Kerckhove, Mme. Ann Fitz-Gerald, Reuel Marc Gercht, M. Kawaz Gerges, David Collyer, David McLaughlin, et Jeffrey Schott, feront partie la conférence.

Le 24 février, 8 h 30 - 16 h 45, « **Les forces canadiennes – capacités nécessaires pour les missions intérieures et à l’étranger** ». L’hon. Peter MacKay (invité), le Général Walter Natynczyk, le Général David Richards, le Général James Mattis, le Lieutenant-général (ret) Michel Maisonneuve, le Vice-amiral Paul Maddison, le Lieutenant-général Peter Devlin, le Lieutenant-général André Deschamps, le Lieutenant-général (ret) Michel Gauthier, le Lieutenant-général Stuart Beare, et le Lieutenant-général Walter Semianiw, feront partie la conférence.

Frais d’inscription (incluant la réception du 23 février):

- donateurs de l’Institut de la CAD, les commanditaires du séminaire, membres et membres associés de la CAD 200 \$
- étudiants à temps plein (équivalent du grade capitaine/lieutenant de vaisseau ou inféreur) 50 \$
- les autres 275 \$
- le déjeuner - le 23 février 40 \$
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Renseignements et enregistrement, avant le 20 février, à notre website: <https://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai>

Regional Group	Number of members	UNSC elected members
African	54	3
Asian	53	2
East European	23	1
Latin American and Caribbean	33	2
Western European and Others	28	2
None	1	--
TOTAL	192	10

UN Regional Groups

serving on the Council was four years. In the last 20 years, however, the three have found it increasingly difficult to be elected.

In 1992, New Zealand won a seat in a contested election against two Europeans, but in 1996 Australia lost to two others. Canada won in 1998 beating the Netherlands and Greece, then lost in 2010 to Germany and Portugal.

And it is not looking good for the future. In 2012 Australia faces another contested election against Finland and Luxembourg, while in 2014 New Zealand faces one against Spain and Turkey. If both should lose, this would mean that none of the CANZ countries would have served on the Council in the 15 years since Canada had in 1999-2000, New Zealand not in 20 years and Australia not in 30 years.

The absence of rules, even informal ones, to ensure fair rotation is clearly a problem. This was not always the case: from 1966 to 1977, there were never more than two can-

didates for the two WEOG seats coming vacant. Since 1978, however, there have only been six clean slates and nine competitions. The 2010 result demonstrated how far the EU group is prepared to go to feather its own nest at the expense of three countries whose combined population of 60 million has arguably made a greater per capita contribution to the United Nations

than the Europeans.

Conclusion

Canadian diplomats should have heeded how CANZ candidacies have fared. Canada was owed "due regard" and should have insisted WEOG negotiate a clean slate - with Canada on it - before presenting it for election. Canada is still owed "due regard," as are Australia in 2012 and New Zealand in 2014. But unless they work out a deal with the EU, there is no reason to believe the outcomes will be any better than in 2010. The first step should be an appeal to the better natures of the Europeans. But if that fails, the CANZ group should be prepared to play hardball to secure their rightful places on the Council. They possess a formidable capacity to make life difficult for others if they choose. ©



Report on the Graduate Student Symposium

by Paul Hillier

The 14th Annual CDA Institute Graduate Student Symposium, held in Currie Hall at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC) on 27-28 October 2011, was a tremendous success.

We further expanded the symposium by building on the success of previous years with focused improvements and changes. We strove to increase the regional diversity of the presenters, the attendance at the Symposium, and the opportunity for presenters to receive feedback on their papers. By each one of these barometers, we surpassed our targets.

Succeeding in gaining greater regional diversity, we had participants coming from 18 institutions. With presenters coming from as far as Memorial University in the east to

the University of British Columbia in the west, we saw Canadian representation from coast to coast, as well as representation from five American institutions. Some 37 papers by graduate students had been selected for delivery from 67 submitted abstracts. Regarding gender diversity, female participation climbed to 12 presenters, just under one-third of the total papers delivered. This represents a significant jump from 2010, itself a record-breaking year.

We had unprecedented success with attendance. Whereas in previous years there had been minimal turnout from RMCC Officer Cadets, this year up to 40 OCdts were attending any given panel, including nearly 200 different OCdts attending some portions of the event. In addition to this, there were over 140 other attendees over the course of the two days, very often filling Currie Hall. Next year, we continue to hope for stronger attendance from CF members at the Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College, CFB Kingston, Canadian Defence Academy, and the local reservist

Paul Hillier is currently the Project Officer at the CDA Institute on an SDF scholarship. He graduated from the University of Alberta with a BA in Political Science and a certificate in Peace and Post Conflict Studies at the University of Alberta. Following which, he completed an MA in Political Science from Queen's University with a focus in the supply chains of defence procurements.

units.

Finally, differentiated from previous years, moderators were allotted time to deliver comments directly to presenters. Judges left the room for this portion so as not to be influenced, leaving the moderators free to provide constructive criticism that students found incredibly valuable in furthering their research. While great emphasis was placed on advertising the Symposium as a professional development opportunity for the audience members, due attention was also given to the expertise of the moderators who were able to guide the presenters through this direct feedback.

Keynote speakers included Dr. Ann Fitz-Gerald, Director, Centre for Security Sector Management, Cranfield University (currently the McNaughton-Vanier Visiting Chair, Royal Military College of Canada); BGen (Ret'd) Serge Labbé, Senior Strategic Partner, Agriculture and Rural Development Ministries, Office of the NATO Senior Civilian Representative, Kabul; and, LCol Ian Hope, PhD, commanding officer Task Force Orion (Afghanistan), 2006.

The judging portion of the event was overseen by LGen (Ret'd) Richard Evraire, Chairman CDA, and his panel of judges, Dr. John Young, RMCC and Dr Roch Legault, RMCC. Substantial cash prizes were awarded to the top three presenters at \$3,000, \$2,000 and \$1,000 respectively.

First place was awarded to Chris Roberts of the University of Alberta for his presentation "The Persistent Salience of a Marginalized Continent: The Canadian Forces in Africa since the Independence Era."

Second place was awarded to Jeremy Stuart of the University of Calgary for his presentation "The Industrial Front: The Canadian Experience in Industrial Mobilization, WWI and WWII."

Third place was awarded to Philip Martin of Carleton University for his presentation "Sharing Power after Deadly Conflict: Do Inclusive Institutions Work After the Fighting Stops?"

These individuals, along with those placing fourth and fifth place were complimented by a signed copy of Chris Alexander's *The Long Way Back: Afghanistan's Quest for Peace*.

Fourth place was awarded to Rebecca Jensen of the University of Calgary for her presentation "Considerations other than war - a Century of Change in Canada's Military."

Fifth Place was awarded to Rachael Bryson of the University of Calgary for her presentation "Cooperation or Contention? Russian Foreign Policy in the Arctic."



Dr. John Scott Cowan, President CDA Institute; Chris Roberts, University of Alberta (first prize winner); Jeremy Stuart, University of Calgary (second prize winner); Philip Marin, Carleton University (third prize winner); Rachael Bryson, University of Calgary (fifth prize winner)

Photo: Meghan Spilka O'Keefe

Presenters were organized into 11 panels covering the following topics:

- Those who Exercise Force: a changing landscape of actors and their roles
- Challenges in Canadian Procurement Policies: learning from the past
- Actors on the World Stage: now and in the coming years
- Arctic Strategies: who's playing and what are they playing for?
- Non-Traditional Security Concerns 1: energy
- Snapshots from Africa: tracing patterns between countries
- Managing Proliferation: theories, institutions, and policies
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- Regimes in Transition: from uprisings to new constitutions
- Security Culture in Canada?: looking through micro and macro cases

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Cyber security - a discussion

Anton Bezglasnyy, Evan Rankin and James Tay. Edited by: Arnav Manchanda

To provide a snapshot of some of the high quality research that was presented at the CDA Institute's Graduate Student Symposium in October, the following article, by Arnav Manchanda, provides an exposé of the panel on cyber security. Arnav was the moderator for Panel XI - Security Culture in Canada?: looking through micro and macro cases. Anton Bezglasnyy (University of British Columbia), Evan Rankin (University of Toronto) and James Tay (University of Toronto) presented their papers, followed by comments and questions facilitated by Arnav Manchanda who was a moderator.

Our three presenters focused on challenges for the government and the military in engaging with cyberspace and the information age for defence, security and foreign policy goals.

Anton Bezglasnyy (AB) spoke about the core elements of an effective Canadian policy response, including allocating new resources, building capacity, harmonizing government response, establishing leadership, and identifying deliverables and performance metrics. He argued for effective international policy responses through a variety of forums, and that cyber security afforded Canada an opportunity to demonstrate international leadership.

Evan Rankin (ER) argued that the roles and responsibilities of the various government stakeholders in cyber security policy are poorly defined, diffusing expertise and mandates and preventing the coordinated implementation of cyber security measures. He compared the Canadian case to that of Australia and the United Kingdom. He also argued that the Canadian Forces (CF) needs to adopt an understanding of cyberspace as a unique domain of warfare.

James Tay (JT) argued that there is a fundamental disconnect between security, technology and public policy, and that the current Canadian cyber security strategy pales in comparison to the scope of challenges presented by cyberspace. He noted two requirements moving forward: cultivating a "cyber security culture" within the Canadian government, and an "integrated cyber foreign policy," with active participation in international and regional forums to advance Canadian interests.

Arnav Manchanda (AM): In October 2010, the federal government released its Cyber Security Strategy, with Public Safety Canada (PSC) taking the lead. How has this arrangement worked so far?

ER: PSC has largely failed to provide leadership on cyber security. The Department has not clearly defined its objectives or metrics for promoting cyber security in Canada. Secondly, there is not a clearly defined and accessible mechanism for interaction between the government and private sector, including working groups and anonymous data sharing. Nev-

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ertheless, PSC is the logical home for public cyber security leadership, though the department must devote more resources to a more centralized policy group.

JT: There are a lot of organizational advantages to having a dedicated, integrated cyber structure. For example, Canada could create a structure similar to that of Britain's Office of Cyber Security. What is important is ensuring that this body has the authority and resources to carry out its tasks.

AB: Clear cyberspace policy leadership must be established at the federal level. Whether this is through the creation of a new agency or the augmentation of an existing department such as PSC, a whole-of-government response is vital. The organization responsible for cyber security needs to have a clear legislative mandate, an authority to act throughout government and the resources necessary to do so. Currently, PSC is missing all three elements.

AM: Do we need a cyber security "champion" in Canada?

AB: The cyber security agenda in Canada needs to emerge in Parliament, with strong legislative support. To operationalize this agenda, a bureaucrat with firm support from lawmakers and with extensive links to - and perhaps experience in - the private sector, would be ideal.

ER: This person has to have the ability to publicly criticize policy and bureaucracy. Given the current political climate in Canada, a politician may not be the best choice to champion cyber. Similarly, an individual embedded in the bureaucracy is not able to place that pressure - the current director general for cyber security policy at PSC remains relatively obscure. An independent appointee, perhaps in the form of a more vocal national security advisor or even a cyber ombudsman, may be able to effect positive change. This government has demonstrated its willingness to listen to private industry, so it would make sense that they would respond to pressure from the business community.

JT: To echo Evan and Anton, this person needs to be able to critique policy and action, be non-partisan, and have firm support from lawmakers. The answer is clear: we need a Cyber Security Commissioner of Canada, an officer of Canada similar to the Privacy Commissioner that reports directly to the House of Commons. This office would have its own staff

and research budget. There should also be an external advisory committee attached to the office to lend expertise and guidance. This committee would be made up of representatives from other departments, in addition to leaders in the private and academic sectors.

AM: One of the main stumbling blocks around the larger cyber agenda is determining who is behind a particular cyber attack, the “attribution problem.” How do we take on this challenge?

JT: Attribution is difficult, but not impossible. Many researchers have been asking the wrong questions: computer forensics and analysis of technical data are useful to a certain extent but yield insufficient evidence to accurately attribute cyber attacks. However, if we take into account the wider social, political and military context surrounding a cyber attack, this can fill in the gaps in the technical data.

AB: Malicious activity in the digital environment is unique due to its low risk nature and low barriers to entry. Even if we can trace an act of espionage, crime, terrorism or warfare to a specific service provider or computer in a foreign state, a critical question remains – who is sitting behind the keyboard? Whether this person is a soldier acting under orders, an individual acting on their own accord (e.g. for criminal purposes), or a mix of the two, will warrant different responses.

ER: It would be interesting to see if we could apply laws of armed conflict to the cyber domain. The International Court of Justice’s Nicaragua judgment says that harbouring a non-state group that is attacking another state is not equivalent to launching an armed attack yourself. How does cyber fit into this framework?

JT: Evan’s thoughts are much more appealing than states taking unilateral action in cyberspace. However, applying the laws of armed conflict would be difficult since it negates the advantage of “plausible deniability” while operating in the cyber domain. There is also difficulty in defining terms such as cyber war, cyber conflict and cyber espionage. However, in the context of cybercrime, the issue of safe harbor is being addressed with some cross-border cooperation to arrest cyber criminals. Perhaps what we need is an international treaty of cyberspace.

AM: What are the international venues for exercising influence and creating the norms and regulations for cyberspace? Where should Canada engage its “cyber foreign policy”?

JT: The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime is an important international effort to achieve consistency in cybercrime laws and law enforcement efforts. Canada is a signatory, but has not yet ratified the treaty. The UN International Telecommunication Union’s Global Cyber Security Agenda has a lot of potential and I would encourage Canada to pursue cyberspace cooperation in this venue. The G8’s Roma/Lyon group would also be a good place to pursue cy-

berspace cooperation among the bigger countries. It is also important that other stakeholders such as civil society and the private sector be involved in shaping these norms and regulations. On the military side, NATO and the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia is a natural starting point.

AB: Irrespective of the venues, it is imperative that the government collaborate with the private sector and civil society in developing Canada’s national priorities for regulating cyberspace. Once these national objectives are outlined through an inclusive process, Canada can pursue bilateral and multilateral partnerships with our major allies, such as the United States, United Kingdom and European Union. This core group of states can then expand to international organizations, with further deliberation and incorporation of norms, standards, incentives and legal frameworks. However, first the government needs to produce a high-level document outlining Canada’s international strategy for the digital environment, similar to the US International Strategy for Cyberspace. Canada could carve out an international leadership role for itself in the current leadership vacuum surrounding cyberspace governance.

AM: Cyberspace is not an uncontested domain, and there is dispute over the norms and rules that you are talking about. What are the international schisms around views of cyberspace? For example, how does our view of cyber in Canada and our allies differ from that of China and Russia, for example?

JT: While all countries seek to “secure cyberspace,” their notions of “securing” have different meanings. In the Middle East and North Africa and some Asian countries, to secure the Internet means to safeguard and preserve current political power and institutions from internal threats, for example from their own citizens who seek to utilize this technology for revolution. Here in the West, “securing” means to ensure that the Internet, which has permeated so much of our economic and social lives, is protected from “external” threats. The goal is to find common ground. I understand Russian and American officials have been working to come to a common understanding on the most basic of cyber definitions. This is encouraging and more efforts at this sort of engagement should take place so as to prevent a cyber arms race.

AB: To an extent, states around the world view cyberspace in a similar way: as an enabler. What governments choose to do with the capabilities that the digital environment brings, is a reflection of their national interests, and security, economic, military and foreign policy priorities. If collectively the most capable states agree that their militarization of cyberspace presents a security dilemma, this could potentially be overcome with a multilateral cyber arms control treaty, perhaps similar in nature to those that prohibit nuclear weapons in the Antarctic, the seabed and in space.

AM: Cyber has and continues to play a vital role in the current unrest in the Middle East, Russia and elsewhere. How should

Canada engage in these developments, generally regarding freedom of action in cyberspace, and more specifically in its attitude towards companies that provide surveillance technologies to these regimes?

ER: If we assume that Canadian interests lie in the freedom of people in other states, we must also acknowledge the usefulness of cyber in promoting that freedom. Unfortunately, we also need to recognize that technologies can be used to repress. Canada's approach must be similarly two-faced: encourage the use of technologies that help human rights organizations, while also seeking to control software that can harm liberties abroad. This is no easy task: lots of software is sold for benign purposes, but can be easily modified or applied in novel, oppressive ways. I suspect that this problem will only worsen as open source software proliferates. However, with software that it is obviously dual use, Canada should encourage companies to make an effort to defend their coding against modification while also trying to prevent resale. With companies that develop and sell surveillance technology and software, Canada should consider applying a licensing program similar to the export licensing applied to weapons.

JT: A good starting point is for Canada to articulate what a Canadian vision of Internet freedom means in its cyber foreign policy. Only by doing so can it enable and shape the direction of its engagement. It could lend support to the development of "liberation technology" for cyberspace, assist in the research and monitoring of online censorship, and support Canadian companies when they face difficulties working with foreign governments (like RIM has recently).

AM: Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently gave a speech at the Conference on Internet Freedom at The Hague on December 8. She was quite forceful in her advocacy for an open Internet in a time where security concerns of many stripes are threatening to segment and securitize the domain. What is your reaction to this strong US position?

JT: I am encouraged by Clinton's speech and I think the United States is putting in a lot of effort at influencing the global public policy regime of Internet freedom and cyber security. However it is also worth noting what was not said in Clinton's speech, and that is the topic of Wikileaks. The free and open Internet that Clinton advocates for fosters not only cyber activists seeking to bring free expression and Internet freedom to repressive countries but also cyber activists in the Western world such as Anonymous, Wikileaks and the Occupy Movement. If the United States is to be committed to Internet freedom, it must be consistent.

ER: Clinton's speech did not stray significantly from past iterations of US cyberspace policy. Much of the onus for ensuring that cyberspace remains open and free was placed on the private sector, which has not been known for dealing ethically with human rights violators in the past, as Clinton herself acknowledges. Little is said about incentivizing "cor-

rect" behaviour, instead leaving decisions about operating in an oppressive environment up to managers, whom Clinton hopes will have a long-term view of what is good for their company. The need for partnership between governments, the private sector and civil society was also trotted out again, but no suggestions on how to move forward were provided. That is the sticking point, after all, because finding effective partnership arrangements has proven exceedingly difficult in the United States, even when pursued only between the private sector and government.

AM: The United States recently established a Cyber Command, bringing together offensive and defensive cyber capabilities to support its military commands and operations. In Canada, the CF recently established a brigadier-general position of Director General Cyber, with a Cyber Task Force operating across the CF. However, the CF remains subordinate in the cyber policy process to PSC. What direction do you think the CF should take?

AB: A "cyber command" would provide an operational focal point for deterring some forms of cyber attack on the Canadian government. Compared with Canada's currently fragmented response to cyber security, whereby a plethora of departments (DND, DFAIT, PSC, RCMP, CSIS, CSEC) are responsible for only their own turf, a centralized response could offer significant advantages in concentrating expertise and capabilities.

JT: US Cyber Command is focused on cyber offence as a good defence. As someone who does not wish to see the further militarization of cyberspace, I would not advocate for Canada to adopt a similar approach. I also do not believe that it is in Canada's best security interests.

ER: The Canadian Forces is stalled in its development of a conceptual framework for cyberspace, an obstacle attributable to the lack of direction given to the CF by its civilian masters. This means that unlike the US military, the CF has not yet acknowledged cyberspace as a functional domain, preventing the development of a holistic cyber doctrine. Thus, while DND does possess some cyber capabilities (particularly at CSEC), they are not guided by a unified strategy. Without a doctrine that guides retaliation and the use of cyber weapons, how would Canada respond to a major cyber attack that struck the nation's critical infrastructure?

AB: Canada's last defence policy paper, the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy, mentions "cyber attacks" only once and does not discuss specific initiatives to ameliorate this threat. Canada's major allies have taken a much more comprehensive approach to the challenge of cyber war. The United States has recognized the digital environment as an operational domain, and the US Department of Defense recently released the public document US DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace. The United Kingdom has also addressed the cyberspace dimensions of defence more thoroughly, in documents such as the 2010 National Security Strategy and 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review. ©



Canadian Defence Intelligence Needs a Legislated Mandate

by Brigadier-General (Ret'd) James Cox

The Canadian defence intelligence organization has undergone significant change in the last decade and is now arguably the most effective intelligence organization in government. Nonetheless, a comparison of expert academic opinion and current defence intelligence practices suggests that important gaps exist between theory and best practice in the area of intelligence policy and governance. Paramount among these gaps is the fact that Canadian defence intelligence has no explicit legislated mandate.

This article suggests the need for a formally legislated basis for defence intelligence. It provides a brief background on defence intelligence adaptation and a theoretical argument for the legitimization of intelligence in government. A recommendation to establish a legal mandate for Canadian defence intelligence follows.

A decade of change

By the time of the al Qaeda attacks on the US, on 11 September 2001 (9/11), the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Forces (CF) had already initiated a formal examination of the defence intelligence organization. An internal DND Chief of Review Services (CRS) program review of defence intelligence started months before 9/11 and concluded in June 2002. It turned out to be a preliminary exercise that confirmed the need for defence intelligence reform. As a result of CRS findings, a full-fledged Defence Intelligence Review (DIR) was initiated to examine defence intelligence organization and practices in National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ). The DIR final report, in May 2004, recommended a number of substantial changes, many of which were authorized for implementation. However, as DIR changes began to be implemented, the entire program of defence intelligence adaptation was swept up in the tsunami of CF transformation begun shortly after General Richard J. Hillier became Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) in February 2005. The DIR no longer propels defence intelligence development, but it does remain something of a touchstone when opportunity for further change arises.

In all the attention given to Canadian defence intel-

ligence adaptation, it appears little or no heed was paid to academic opinion found in expert literature. For all the work that went into the DIR, the public version of the final report includes no bibliography of any academic or other expert literature examined in the course of the review. The DIR does make the point that defence intelligence activities flow from the legal mandate to conduct defence activities and must comply with Canadian and international laws. Beyond that, however, the DIR does not explore the democratic requirement for an explicit legal mandate for defence intelligence, nor does it recognize any expert opinion supporting that option.

Legitimization of intelligence in government

According to expert academic views, intelligence services are legitimate only when their exceptional powers are derived from proper legislation. Legislation governing intelligence services should be clear and specific, and include: 1) geographic responsibilities; 2) subjects of investigation; 3) limits of competence and restrictions on activities; 4) relations among the services working within the intelligence community and their coordination; 5) means by which intelligence services are held accountable, including mechanisms of executive control, legislative oversight and judicial review; and 6) legal means to deal with complaints in cases of agency misconduct.

Legitimization can come in one or both of two forms. First, the intelligence function can be established in law. A legislated basis can be as sophisticated as the United States Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 that deals with many aspects of the government intelligence community in one document. Alternatively, individual elements of the government intelligence establishment can be dealt with in separate government acts. For example, in Australia, The Intelligence Services Act 2001 makes explicit the role of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in directing the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) and authorising the conduct of specific activities.

New democracies, like South Africa, have produced interesting literature on the subordination of intelligence to the rule of law. Sandy Africa and Siyabulela Mlombile, pioneers of the transformation of South African intelligence services following the demise of Apartheid, have studied the South African transition experience and identified a number of important key lessons that impact the governance structure of intelligence, including the following requirements: 1) define the country's security vision and framework in law; 2) ensure ministerial supervision of the services, as opposed to arms' length knowledge of their functioning; and 3) each intelligence service must have procedures for internally authorizing operations that are sufficiently clear and could there-

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fore be audited for effectiveness, should a minister wish to confirm the legality of a particular operation; and establish parliamentary oversight.

Throughout other expert literature, discussion of intelligence legislation usually centres on control and accountability, largely because the secrecy needed for intelligence activities creates the potential for or perception of abuse of intrusive powers by intelligence services. Control and accountability arrangements must balance, and be seen to balance, the defence of national interests with the safeguarding of individual rights and freedoms.

Control, in the narrowest sense, means ensuring that specific procedures, both formal and informal, are followed. There are three forms of control found throughout the expert literature – political control, exercised by congress or parliament, usually indirectly through elected government officials (cabinet and/or ministers); operational control, exercised by the executive arm of government; and administrative control, exercised by appointed heads of intelligence agencies, who are under the operational and political control of ministers.

Allocation and limitation of responsibilities for intelligence work is critical for both the protection of civil liberties and for effectiveness. A group of Harvard experts studying the enhancement of Peruvian intelligence agencies pointedly suggested that the law should confer upon each intelligence agency a clearly defined mandate. They also argued the law should define what forms of action can and cannot be engaged in by an intelligence agency.

Expert intelligence literature thus suggests that the legitimization of government intelligence is based in comprehensive and explicit legislation. This is not the case with Canadian defence intelligence.

No Legislated Framework

Canadian defence intelligence has no explicit federally legislated basis. The National Defence Act (NDA) implicitly makes the Minister of National Defence (MND) responsible and accountable for Canadian defence intelligence, but there is no higher national legislation or policy that publicly defines the role of Canadian defence intelligence, or the powers conferred upon the MND to engage its activity.

In the absence of such legislation, Canadian defence intelligence activity is conducted under the doctrine of Crown prerogative, a circumstance that can be considered safe as long as government remains truly democratic and practitioners operate within the law, with ethical and professional credibility. The customs and traditions of the profession of arms in Canada yield a culture in which CF defence intelligence activity is not likely to unlawfully infringe on the

civil liberties of Canadians, at least that is the governing assumption. But what of civilian defence intelligence leaders and practitioners?

Defence intelligence capabilities are much more extensive and sophisticated today, and they are more frequently deployed within Canada. In certain circumstances, authorized by law and ministerial direction, intrusive defence intelligence collection means have been carried out by defence intelligence elements when placed in support of other lead government departments such as they were for the preparation and conduct of the 2010 Olympic Winter Games in Vancouver. Government also exercises the Crown prerogative when it deploys CF elements overseas, as part of a ‘whole-of-government’ mission.

In both scenarios, expert literature suggests that parameters of such support should be spelled out in a formal way. Justice O’Connor’s report dealing with Maher Arar recognizes the value of inter-departmental cooperation and specifically states, “Agreements or arrangements with other entities in regard to integrated national security operations should be reduced to writing.” O’Connor also made the point that agencies must remain cognizant of and operate within their legislated mandate, something Canadian defence intelligence does not have.

The absence of a legislated framework impedes the development of effective intelligence governance and accountability measures. Democratic intelligence activity is continually treading a sensitive middle course between complete autonomy (thereby risking becoming a force unto itself) and being micro-managed by a minister (thereby risking becoming a private ‘arm’ of that minister). An appropriate ministerial control mechanism is an important element that should be covered by the legal framework. Moreover, any such ministerial control mechanism should itself be subject to effective oversight and accountability measures.

Establish a legal mandate for Canadian defence intelligence.

The DIR did not fully consider the requirement to provide a legislated mandate for Canadian defence intelligence organization and activity. Academic opinions throughout the considerable body of expert literature in the field of intelligence studies provide a variety of views on how an explicit legislated mandate might be developed, implemented and exercised. Legislation governing the Canadian defence intelligence organization and practices should be passed to position the defence intelligence function within the government intelligence community and clarify the nature and use of domestic and external defence intelligence capabilities. The NDA should be amended to include a part dedicated to defence intelligence, similar to the part focused on the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC). ©

(endnotes)

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Africa was General Manager of the South African Intelligence Academy, the corporate training facility of the National Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret Services. Previously she participated in a support capacity in the proceedings of the resolutions that were taken up in the new intelligence legislation. Mlombile died in 2006. He had been General Manager of Support Services in the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee, the statutory body that coordinated South African intelligence services. Mlombile was a member of the Secretariat to the Ministerial Commission on Transformation of Defense Intelligence, the Secretariat to the Ministerial Intelligence Review Commission, and the Secretariat to the Heads of Civilian Intelligence Services.

. DCAF has completed considerable research in this field of study See the DCAF website at <http://www.dcaf.ch/Topics/Detail?lng=en&id=121488> (accessed 24 August 2011).

. Harvard University, "Initiative Report: Peruvian Intelligence Reform Initiative," Internal Security Reform Program, (Harvard University Program on Justice Reform in Times of Transition, April-July, 2002), 8, at http://www.pjtt.org/assets/pdf/project_reports_pdf/LA/INTERNAL%20SECURITY%20REFORM%20PROGRAM_2002.pdf (accessed 24 August 2011).

. Peter Hogg, a leading constitutional law commentator, has described the prerogative power as follows: "The royal prerogative consists of the powers and privileges accorded by the common law to the Crown. Dicey describes it as "the residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority, which at any given time is left in the hands of the Crown." The prerogative is a branch of the common law, because it is the decisions of the courts, which have determined its existence and extent. Constitutional Law of Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985), 10. Halsbury's Law of England, Vol. 8(2), 4th ed., 244, para. 367.

. To some extent, such activity is governed by three specific Departmental Administrative Orders and Directives (DAOD). See DAOD 8002-0 Counter-Intelligence, 8002-1 National Counter-Intelligence Program, and 8002-2 Canadian Forces Counter-Intelligence Unit, on the DND Assistant Deputy Minister Finance and Corporate Services website at <http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/dao-doa/8000/index-eng.asp> (accessed 24 August 2011). There are other DAODs dealing with specific intelligence disciplines such as HUMINT, but they are classified documents not available to the public.

. CF intelligence assets were deployed in support of the Integrated Security Group (ISG), led by the RCMP, which coordinated security for the 2010 Olympic Winter Games in Canada. Within the ISG was the Joint Intelligence Group (JIG), which included military intelligence representatives.

. Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar, "Analysis and Recommendations," Chapter IX, Recommendation 2E, p. 321, at http://www.pch.gc.ca/cs-kc/arar/Arar_e.pdf (accessed 24 August 2011)

. Ibid., Recommendation 1, p. 312. While the CF remains subject to, inter alia, the NDA and the Criminal Code of Canada, Canadian defence intelligence per se is not specifically identified or mandated in either of those documents, nor is it given a mandate in any other legislative instrument.

. Department of Justice, National Defence Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. N-5), Part V.1, at <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/N-5/> (accessed 25 August 2011).



From Sea to Ashore: The Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defence

by David S. McDonough

Critics of US President Barack Obama have been quick to attack his administration for "scrapping" missile defence. Others more suspicious of Bush's ground-based midcourse defence (GMD) system undoubtedly found Washington's newfound hesitancy more than a little reassuring – and those in this country who were glad to see Prime Minister Paul Martin's 2005 refusal to participate on GMD may even feel vindicated. Admittedly, the Obama administration has shown little vested interest in pursuing BMD and moved quickly to cancel his predecessor's plan to extend GMD to Europe. Yet it would still be a mistake to take this narrative at face value, as a more careful review of Obama's own missile defence revisions will show.

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President Obama reduced funding for the Missile Defense Agency, curtailed the interceptor deployment for GMD, and cancelled its expansion into Europe. However, funding for BMD remains at a sizable \$10 billion per year, which is still larger than comparable funding from Presidents Reagan to Clinton and is close to the Bush administration's high of \$12 billion. True, the total number of ground-based interceptors (GBIs) are now limited to 26 at Fort Greely and 4 at Vandenberg Air Force Base. Yet Obama has chosen not to dismantle any of these constructed GBI sites and permitted the construction of an additional field of 14 GBI silos at Fort Greely, Alaska that could be armed with a reserve of 8 GBIs – these would come from the inventory used for testing. As such, Obama will have 30 operational GBIs and 8 interceptors on reserve, which does not represent a significant departure from the 44 GBIs in North America envisioned by his predecessor.

Perhaps a clearer argument can be built from Obama's decision to cancel the GMD expansion into Europe, specifically a field of 10 GBIs in Poland and the Euro-

pean Midcourse Radar in the Czech Republic. Clearly, these GMD components provide an important supplement to the American capacity to intercept an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) from Iran. It is more uncertain whether this European-based site would actually be capable of a second intercept under the “shoot-look-shoot” firing procedure, especially if Iran launches a missile from the northwest part of its territory. But at the very least, the United States would be capable of a second interception from GBIs located in North America.

Yet it is important to understand that Obama, rather than just cancelling the extension of GMD into Europe, was also careful to introduce as a replacement the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA). Initially, this PAA system will rely on Aegis BMD ships armed with the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) Block IA, which would be capable of intercepting shorter-range missiles. It would also benefit from the forward-based x-band radar (AN/TPY-2) in Turkey. Yet in subsequent phases, expected to take place from 2015 and 2020, PAA would feature incremental system improvements – including three successive upgrades to the Aegis combat system; new SM-3 interceptors (the Block 1B, Block IIA, and Block IIB), which in its final configuration would have a limited capacity to counter ICBMs; and under the “Aegis Ashore” concept, two land-based Aegis systems in Romania (2015) and Poland (2018).

Under the PAA plan, the total number of SM-3 interceptors is expected to increase from the present inventory of over one hundred to 341 by 2016. Meanwhile, the Aegis BMD fleet is expected to grow in tandem to reach 41 ships by that year, or almost double the current number of BMD-capable ships today. The Congressional Research Service also estimates that the SM-3 inventory will eventually grow to over 500 by 2020, depending of course on the extent of Iran’s long-range ballistic missile program. The exact number of Block IIB interceptors, which are designed to counter this long-range threat, has yet to be determined. But it would not be unexpected if Washington procured at least a dozen of these more advanced missiles.

Clearly, President Obama’s plan for a PAA system is meant to provide a robust theatre missile defence against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, involving at least five hundred interceptors on over forty ships and at two land-based sites in Europe. And the administration has certainly not been idle since it first announced this approach in September 2009 – first, by signing a deal with Romania for an initial battery of 23 SM-3 interceptors, and more recently by making agreements with Turkey for the deployment of the AN/TPY-2 radar and with Poland for the second Aegis Ashore site. The United States also sent the Aegis cruiser USS *Monterey* for a six-month deployment in the Mediterranean in March 2011.

However, by the 2018-2020 timeframe, the PAA system will also develop a limited strategic defence capability against longer-range missiles. True, compared to his predecessor’s now cancelled plan for a fully formed GMD against ICBMs, this might seem to be a significant delay for a vital capability. Yet it is important to recognize that Bush’s proposed GMD sites were likely to only achieve operational capability after several years. Also, with only 10 GBIs designed primar-

ily to counter long-range attacks, this system would be highly vulnerable to a precursor attack using shorter-range missiles – at least in the absence of the robust theatre systems largely absent from Bush’s envisioned plans.

Furthermore, the SM-3 also has the important advantage of being more affordable than a GBI. For example, each missile only costs \$10 million compared to GBI’s \$70 million price tag and newer variants are not expected to significantly diverge from this trend. With the Pentagon facing the prospect of budget cuts, especially following the failure of the bipartisan Super-Committee on deficit reduction, the Standard Missile is likely to become an even more attractive option. While Aegis ships are themselves far from inexpensive, these platforms would need to be procured even in the absence of BMD – at least if the United States still expected to maintain its maritime freedom of action in the face of growing anti-access and area-denial threats.

With SM-3 also being much smaller (1 ton compared to 20 tons for a GBI), a single Aegis destroyer vehicle launch system would be capable of holding up to a hundred missiles – the number of SM-3s could then be dramatically increased without necessarily even requiring more ships. And the land-based variant of the SM-3 is expected to have a much smaller and cheaper infrastructure than the massive silo complex required for GBIs. Indeed, these land-based SM-3 locations will be designed to be transportable – in the event that the host nation makes such a request or if the US seeks to surge its land-based Aegis BMD capabilities elsewhere.

To be sure, the United States is taking some risk by relying on the eventual development of the SM-3 Block IIB missile, which needs to be designed with sufficient velocity to be capable of intercepting ICBMs. Yet one should also recall that the GBIs for Europe would have consisted of an untested two-stage version of the interceptor, meant to provide a higher velocity required for interception of Iranian missiles from Europe. Meanwhile, early variants of the SM-3 have already gone through an even more robust and successful testing process than its GBI equivalent. Indeed, in a recent April 2011 test, the Block IA missile successfully intercepted an intermediate-range ballistic missile, despite being designed against shorter-range missiles and not relying on the more advanced Aegis system. Later versions of the SM-3 will in turn be capable of interception in the post-boost ascent-phase of the missile’s ballistic trajectory. This has the advantage of intercepting the missile prior to the release of the warhead bus and possible decoys, while providing for a more complex or “multilayered” system when combined with GMD’s existing capability for midcourse interceptions.

One possible drawback of the PAA is its reliance on a limited number of Aegis BMD ships. Demand could very well exceed supply, especially given that these ships are expensive multi-mission platforms. As a result, there is at present some uncertainty on whether these ships will be surged to a region during a crisis or will be home-based in Europe and elsewhere on a semi-permanent arrangement. Yet this limitation will gradually decline as the number of ships modified for BMD is nearly doubled over the next several years. Meanwhile, the two Aegis Ashore sites in Europe will lessen sea-based requirements for these ships, and there is nothing

preventing the construction of additional land-based sites if required.

Importantly, Obama's expanded use of sea-based BMDs also provides an element of flexibility in the system's architecture. For example, Aegis BMD ships that might normally be deployed to Europe can still be surged elsewhere – this will provide a crisis response capability that is global in nature. These ships will also benefit from their small size and mobility, while being capable of being armed with SM-2 blast fragmentation warheads, originally designed to destroy air-breathing threats and capable of providing terminal-phased defence against ballistic missile attacks. Even the land-based Aegis Ashore systems in Romania and Poland will be small in size and semi-mobile in nature, compared to GMD's use of fixed sites.

President Obama has called for incremental improvements to America's BMD capabilities, with an initial emphasis on theatre missile defences that will gradually evolve to a capability for limited strategic defence by the end of the decade. Rather than retrenching missile defence, the PAA system instead offers an ambitious vision for BMD – and one that has certain advantages in terms of cost, effectiveness, and flexibility over the Bush's original plans. It has also served to reignite the interest of NATO in missile defences, with the alliance agreeing in the Lisbon 2010 summit to field missile defences capable of protecting population centres, with the PAA incorporated as the American contribution to this endeavour.

However, critics are correct in at least one respect: Washington has at least in the near term put off fielding SM-3s interceptors designed against long-range missiles. And the anti-ICBM defences that will be deployed later this decade will be designed for early ascent-phase interceptions.

This last point has some implications for Canada's possible involvement in any future system. As noted by James Fergusson, Canadian territory might prove a valuable location for GBI silos or an x-band radar site to support a mid-course interception of an Iranian ICBM. Yet ascent-phased

interceptions, with their compressed engagement timelines, places priority on forward-deployed interceptor and radar sites over those in more distant locales. Indeed, by emphasizing interceptions earlier in the missile's trajectory, the United States would be better placed to undertake a second interception from forward locations, in addition to a greater capacity to deal with precursor salvos from an adversary's shorter-range missiles. Of course, much depends on the velocity of the SM-3 and the location of Aegis BMD ships and Iranian ICBM launch sites. But it is certainly possible that Canada could find itself unable to leverage the use of its territory as an "in-kind" contribution to participate in BMD.

In that case, Canadian officials might be forced to explore more costly alternatives. One possibility can be found in the PAA's reliance on sea-based platforms. After all, the Canadian Royal Navy (RCN) will soon be proceeding with a major fleet-replacement program to replace its aging destroyers and frigates with the Canadian Surface Combatant, and a few of these new warships could be equipped with the Aegis combat system. This would help the RCN preserve interoperability with a future American fleet increasingly reliant on Aegis technology. It would also provide a much needed defensive capability against aircraft, anti-ship cruise missiles, and other anti-access threats.

One should recall that the RCN already operates a small number of Iroquois-class destroyers armed with vertical-launched Standard Missiles. In that sense, the Aegis system would simply represent an evolutionary step for a naval fleet with a tradition of providing an area-air defence capability. Norway has already acquired Aegis-equipped frigates, so it is not unknown for a smaller-sized country with vessels of only modest tonnage to procure this weapon system. Importantly, Canada would be given at least the option of upgrading to an Aegis BMD capability in the future. And with the wide variety of Standard Missiles, it would have flexibility in selecting its own particular BMD role – from terminal interceptions with the SM-2 to theatre or strategic defence with different variants of the SM-3. ©

(endnotes)

United States, Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, February 2010, 17.

Options for Deploying Missile Defenses in Europe (Washington, DC: Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office, February 2009), 31. As such, I would disagree with Jim Fergusson's argument that President Obama – by cancelling Bush's European-based GBI site – also prevented the application of the shoot-look-shoot procedure against long-range Iranian missiles and thereby a second intercept layer in Europe. See his "The Return of Ballistic Missile Defence," *On Track* 15, 3 (Fall 2010): 37.

Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, 24-28.

Ronald O'Rourke, "Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress," CRS Report for Congress (19 April 2011), 55 and "BMD, in from the Sea: SM-3 Missiles Going Ashore," *Defense Industry Daily*, 19 September 2011, <http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Land-Based-SM-3s-for-Israel-04986>.

Amy Butler, "Pentagon Mulls Hurdles to Early Missile Intercept," *Aviation Week*, 13 July 2011. Also see George Galdorisi and Scott C. Truver, "Resetting Missile Defenses: Setting the Matter Straight," *Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes* (May 2011), 1-3.

The ascent-phase takes place after the boost-phase, when the booster rocket burns out and the weapons ascends up to the trajectory's high point, the apogee. Previously, the midcourse had meant both the ascending and descending parts of the trajectory – though the ascent-phase has since become its own separate category due to burgeoning interest in early intercepts by the US Missile Defense Agency.

O'Rourke, "Navy Aegis Ballistic," 56.

James Fergusson, "The Return of Ballistic Missile Defence," *On Track* 15, 3 (Autumn 2010): 36-38.

Letter to the Editor

In the fall issue of ON TRACK, I provided commentary mainly focused on the summer edition article, “Canada’s Partnership in the Joint Strike Fighter Program” by Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) George Macdonald. In this same fall issue, his rejoinder was published. As such, I would now like to respond to his views under four headings.

F-35 costs

I was glad to read that nowhere does Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) Macdonald dispute my statement that we do not know the costs to acquire or to sustain the aircraft. Apparently he is willing to accept this. I am not. To make an acquisition using taxpayers’ money without knowing the costs is irresponsible and can dramatically rob the Canadian Forces’ capital program of funds to meet other military priorities.

New fighter requirements

Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) Macdonald writes, “I seriously doubt that they [the DND project team] made any recommendation to the defence minister in 2006.” He is wrong. They did make the recommendation. The briefing note for the minister containing these recommendations is dated 19 September 2006. It states:

In May 2006, CAS [Chief of Air Staff] completed an options analysis study that examined the global market for next-generation tactical fighter aircraft. The results of this study have indicated that the JSF [Joint Strike Fighter] family of aircraft provides the best available operational capabilities to meet Canadian operational requirements, while providing the longest service life and the lowest per aircraft cost of all options considered.

This recommendation predates the completion of the statement of requirements (SOR) that was only completed in 2010. As such, can anyone seriously doubt that the SOR was wired or fixed to meet the recommendation made to the minister four years earlier? Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) Macdonald writes, “[t]he project team had access to all the data they needed.” Of that, I have little doubt. However, I contend that they just wanted the data to support their already determined solution.


Industrial benefits

Under the F-35 program Canadian industry will get to bid on about \$12 billion in opportunities and will hopefully win \$4-6 billion. Under a competition Canada will be guaranteed high quality benefits equal to or greater than the costs to acquire and sustain the aircraft. The government estimates this to be \$16 billion. As of today, the costs are more likely in the \$20-25 billion dollar range. It seems to me that \$20-25 billion in guaranteed benefits are a lot better than \$4-6 billion in potential benefits.

Conclusion

Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) Macdonald writes, “[w]e need to be committed to provide the Canadian Forces with the best capability possible that meets the requirement, consistent with the government’s mandate.” I could not agree more. The difference between us is that he advocates an aircraft whose capability is unknown, whose requirements, I argue, have been rigged and whose price is unknown and rising. I, on the other hand, am simply advocating an open, fair and transparent competition. If the F-35 is truly the best aircraft at the best price it will win the competition.

Alan Williams
President of The Williams Group



Conquered into Liberty: Two Centuries of Battles Along the Great Warpath That Made the American Way of War

by *Eliot A. Cohen*

Reviewed by J.L. Grantatstein

Eliot A. Cohen. *Conquered into Liberty: Two Centuries of Battles Along the Great Warpath That Made the American Way of War*. New York: The Free Press, 2011. 405 pages. \$34.99, ISBN 978-0-7432-4990-4.

This is a curious book. Eliot Cohen is best known as a former U.S. State Department official and as a professor of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University. He has written a number of books, almost all of which focus heavily on current strategic debates. And now here he is writing about American (or North American, more properly) history over the 17th to 19th Centuries—with some grafted-on conclusions that draw not very convincing contemporary parallels to the American way of war. Cohen's attention is fixed on The Great Warpath, the aboriginal route that ran north and south between what became Albany, New York, and Montreal, in effect the water route of the Hudson River, over Lakes George and Champlain, and northwards along the Richelieu River. Here Cohen sets the long struggle between French and English and then between Americans and British and Canadians. This is a good topic, to be sure, one that Cohen says has fascinated him since he was a child.

Curiously, the focus of his book is on the Seven Years War (three chapters) and the Revolutionary War (four chapters), but on the eve of the bicentennial of the War of 1812, he devotes only a single chapter to this conflict, a treatise on the naval battle of Plattsburgh in 1814. This strikes this reader as a lost opportunity.


Then there is his title, *Conquered Into Liberty*. Most Canadians—and likely most Americans—have never realized that the American colonists invaded Canada in 1775 before their Declaration of Independence. The aim was to persuade Quebec's colonists, a few handfuls of disgruntled English-speaking merchants and the recently defeated French-speaking habitants, to throw their lot in with the rebellious, unhappy Americans. To "persuade" the Quebeckers and Québécois, the Americans sent in their unruly, ill-disciplined troops, struggled northward, and took Saint Jean and then Montreal. "You have been conquered into liberty," the Continental Congress told Quebec, "if you act as you ought." Some liberty. The Protestant Americans implicitly threatened the Roman Catholicism of the Québécois, their faith guaranteed by the British. But none of this mattered when the American troops failed to capture Quebec on December 31, 1775, and the Royal Navy arrived with supplies and reinforcements in May 1776.

Some title: *Conquered Into Liberty* indeed. As Benjamin Franklin, sent to Montreal to help persuade Quebec to join in the revolution, noted, American soldiers had "recourse to violence" to get supplies, something that

"indispose[d] and irritate[d] the mind of the people." Summing up, Cohen notes that "the abortive invasion of Canada combined, in a distinctively American way, idealism and calculating realpolitik...sincerely advocating representative government and individual liberty, while manipulating local beliefs, brazenly attacking a neighbor in order to secure the fundamental and perilous decision for independence." It was, he says (sadly?) much like Vietnam and Iraq, ventures with "mixed motives and uncertain outcomes." The single and last paragraph of the key chapter of the book (if the fact that the title is found there makes it critically important) does not really offer much of a pointer to the contemporary world.

Cohen's single chapter on the 1812 to 1815 war, the second of the Anglo-American conflicts, skims quickly over the standard events, but focuses on the naval skirmish on Lake Champlain off Plattsburgh where Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough pulled off an unlikely victory over the British. This checked Sir George Prevost's invading army, and let the Americans escape the consequences of—more or less—losing the War of 1812 in the negotiations that were then underway at Ghent in Belgium. This was a signal triumph, one that usually gets less notice in Canadian (or British) accounts than the struggles on the Niagara frontier or the Great Lakes. Whether it proves, as Cohen suggests, that henceforth no European power could project sufficient military power into North America to seriously threaten the United States is arguable.

Cohen's book is well-written and generally well-researched. It is yet another instance of present-day American scholars looking seriously at all of North America. Fred Anderson's fine *Crucible of War* on the Seven Years War, Maya Jasanoff's excellent examination of the Loyalists, and best of them all, Alan Taylor's superb study of the War of 1812 are books that make one wonder just what Canadian historians are doing or, rather, not doing. Finally, one might wish that Professor Cohen had checked the spelling of the Father of Confederation who makes it briefly into the book only to be described as "anti-American" and to be consistently spelled erroneously as John A. MacDonald. If being Canadian is enough to merit the characterization of "anti-American", that might be tolerable; but there's no excuse for getting John A.'s surname wrong. ©



The Savage War

by Murray Brewster

Reviewed by David Perry

Brewster, Murray. *The Savage War: The Untold Battles of Afghanistan*. John Wiley & Sons Canada, Ltd., Mississauga ON. ISBN 978-1-118-11593-0 (cloth); 978-1-118-12206-8 (ePub); 978-1-118-12207-5 (ePDF); 978-1-118-12208-2 (Mobi). \$34.95

The Savage War offers the first literary treatment of Canada's Afghan campaign to bridge the divide between the troops in the field and the politicians that sent them there. Veteran Canadian Press defence correspondent Murray Brewster bases his first book on extensive field experience he gained through multiple trips to Afghanistan (totalling over 15 months in theatre since 2006), in combination with his tenure reporting from NATO meetings and conducting interviews with senior politicians, mandarins and soldiers. The result is a unique account of Canada's war in Afghanistan from 2006 onwards. In many ways, Brewster takes up where Eugene Lang and Janice Stein's *The Unexpected War* left off, by analyzing the decision-making and strategy behind the war from 2006 onwards. At the same time, he combines the strategic narrative with events on the ground, both embedded with the troops and outside the wire among Afghans, serving to highlight the frequent mismatch between the war in Afghanistan and its portrayal in Ottawa. The result is a fascinating account that will be of interest to anyone that followed events in Afghanistan.

Beginning with his arrival into Kabul in the spring of 2006 and ending in the summer of 2011, Brewster provides a number of unique insights into the war. Some, like the extended discussion of the detainee scandal, have appeared in his prior reporting and been extensively debated in the media. But many others have not. Three are worth mentioning here: his descriptions of the centralization of decision making related to Afghanistan; the challenges of reporting on the war; and, inter-alliance dynamics.


One of Brewster's more revelatory claims is that upon assuming office, the Conservatives had planned a national marketing campaign to sell the country on the merits of the Afghan war. As he relates, this initiative was cancelled on the basis of internal polling conducted after Harper's March 2006 speech in Afghanistan, which informed his staffers that the public simply was not with the government on its support for war. Consequently, the government public relations team went into a defensive posture that would last throughout the war, leading to the controversies over the decision to stop lowering the Peace Tower flag (on Parliament) upon soldier's deaths and the media ban at repatriation ceremonies. The reactive posture on the part of the government also led Conservative political staff to happily cede the lead public relations role to Chief of the Defence Staff General Rick Hillier. As a result, Brewster argues there was no "consoler-in-chief" during the spring and summer

of 2006, when Canada began suffering the first significant combat fatalities since Korea. The concentration of decision making in the Prime Minister's inner circle would persist through the war, as Brewster recounts how the announcement of both the Manley Panel and decision to end the combat phase of the war were made without Defence Minister Peter MacKay's knowledge.

The messaging decision made early in 2006 would also have lasting implications on relations with the press, as the government spin masters decided to refocus their efforts towards emphasizing the more marketable humanitarian mission, and support for Afghan women's rights. Brewster describes how the plausibility of this narrative fell apart almost immediately, as in the aftermath of Operation Medusa it was clear to reporters on the ground that the Taliban was not the spent force some described it as, and thus security would remain the missions focus. The official desire that the "3D" (defence, diplomacy, development) aspects of the mission be covered more extensively was furthermore made impossible from 2006-2008 by the near total absence of diplomats and development officers on the ground in Kandahar, and later complicated by restrictions on what bureaucrats could say.

Brewster's other interesting insight is to offer a fresh perspective on the alliance politics of the mission. He describes how at times the Canadians faced paternalistic assessments from the coalition leadership who did not believe pessimistic reports about conditions on the ground in Kandahar prior to Operation Medusa, and then second-guessed Canada's conduct of that action. At the same time, the 2007 NATO summit in Riga revealed that some European members held condescending views about past deficiencies in Canada's NATO commitments as well as scepticism from the Americans who thought the Canadian military was capable of doing more on its own.

In sum, *The Savage War* provides a fresh take on Canada's Afghan war that is both insightful and accessible. While Brewster is at times a touch dramatic - stating for example "By late August 2006, the headlines had started to scream at you" - the book is thoroughly engaging. Combining solid field research and a storyteller's narrative, it is well worth a read. ©



Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach

by Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski

Reviewed by Paul Hillier

Rostek, M., and P. Gizewski, eds. 2011. *Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach*. Montreal / Kingston: Queen's Policy Studies Series, McGill-Queen's University

Press.

One of the primary lessons learned by western militaries over the past two decades has been the need to engage other actors to achieve their aims in theatre, both domestic and expeditionary. Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski gather together a multitude of authors' perspectives exploring how the Comprehensive Approach (CA) fills this need.

Accordingly, the introductory and concluding chapters frame CA as a doctrine primarily concerned with security and defence where the primary actors are militaries. While the doctrine seeks to embrace the whole of government, the very title of Rostek and Gizewski's book explicitly displays that at the centre of CA is security. A strength of the volume is the nuance presented between chapters, whereby each author individually conceptualizes and explores the subtleties of CA. In providing 19 chapters on the different manners in which the comprehensive approach has been developed and operationalized, this volume serves as a defining piece for academics and implementers.

The question I would therefore ask is, by accepting that CA is exclusively about achieving security, are we sidelining or excluding entirely all organizations not concerned with security?

The chapters are divided into five main sections: the discovery and rediscovery of CA, nongovernmental organization (NGO) approaches, international operations, domestic operations, and the operationalisation of CA.

The first section looks at the development of CA by western militaries throughout the past two decades. It examines internationally changing demands since the end of the Cold War, as well as comparisons between how various western countries use CA.

The second section questions whether a security-based, military-led approach is in the interest of NGOs, and whether the cultural differences between militaries and NGOs are substantial enough to demand rethinking CA. This is seen in the title of Chapter 6, "We Share the Same Space, Not the Same Purpose."

With specific attention given to the case of Afghanistan, the chapters in the third section on international operations tackle many of the core issues of CA. This includes the need for strategic approaches to operations within the joint, interagency, multinational, and public (JIMP) environment, as well as requiring a broader set of actors beyond the military, given that CA is being used to provide security in failed states where insecurity owes much to economics or underdevelopment.


Building from the previous section, the three chapters on domestic security concerns provide an interesting

contrast to what is experienced internationally. In considering CA during the 2010 Vancouver Olympics, Bernard Brister attributes the fact that there were no extreme clashes in culture between organizations to the "absence of an event requiring a sustained combined joint response." Christian Leuprecht's conclusion—building from the contention put forth in this third section by Brister that extended operations may experience challenges that short-term deployments do not—effectively contrasts CA in domestic operations against how it is used internationally.

The final section asks us to consider the implementation of CA. One chapter entitled "The Relationship Between Non-Governmental Organizations and the Canadian Forces" by a collective of authors effectively blends qualitative and quantitative methodologies to point out some of the tactical challenges that remain when executing CA. In the subsequent chapter, editor Michael Rostek examines the various stages to adopting an international norm, arguing that CA is still emerging and that Canada must play a leading role to take it to the tipping point.

While ultimately I have very strong praise for the clarity and diversity of the book, I question the extent to which CA is framed exclusively as a security and defence concept. It is possible that the chapter on Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) is merely a four-page outlier in the book, and perhaps it is the case that actors must agree with Christian Leuprecht's assessment in the conclusion of the book, "let us not kid ourselves: Security is the priority. DDR - disarmament, development and reconstruction - is really Ddr: The primary concern is disarmament of which development and reconstruction are an integral yet secondary dimension." However, the case for MSF's exceptionalism is overstated. There are any number of actors in theatre whose services range from food and agriculture, to children's issues, to human rights, where the priority is not to establish security in the context of nation-building, but instead to play a vital role in reconstruction. As such, framing the book around the notion that CA is necessarily linked to security operations may need to be reconsidered.

The question becomes whether it is helpful, then, to consider these agencies as outside of CA altogether, given that even the authors writing on MSF in chapter 6 (Marilyn McHarg and Kevin Coppock) write, "the comprehensive approach involves using aid as a tool for stabilization and counter-insurgency objectives." And perhaps we should accept that CA should not be used in the converse, where stabilization and counter-insurgency objectives are undertaken as a means to providing aid. But perhaps that's a discussion worth having. ©



The Long Way Back: Afghanistan's Quest for Peace

by Chris Alexander

Reviewed by Meghan Spilka O'Keefe

Alexander, Chris. *The Long Way Back: Afghanistan's Quest for Peace*. HarperCollins Canada, 304 pages. ISBN: 9781554687992. \$32.99 (Hardcover)

Chris Alexander's *The Long Way Back: Afghanistan's Quest for Peace* is much more than a reflection of his two years as Canada's ambassador to Afghanistan and his four years as the United Nations (UN) deputy special representative to the secretary-general of UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. It is even much more than a launch pad for a political career. *The Long Way Back* is a genuine, honest and optimistic plea to leaders—and the people who elect them—that developing and securing Afghanistan is both a worthy and feasible effort.

His plea begins with a historical memory of the time when Afghanistan was more peaceful, secure, and culturally rich in the arts. This account enables Alexander to argue that, "Afghanistan's surviving literature and artifacts are important because they remind us that the country is hardly a primitive back-water." His historical account also illustrates events and episodes that currently undermine development and contribute to the complex nature of Afghanistan ongoing troubles. Imperative to the importance of understanding history, Alexander draws on the legacy of regional relations and how this past lends insight into current concerns about Pakistan's posturing, which continues to be a significant source of ongoing instability.

Alexander, however, is at his best in the contemporary where he is able to draw on personal experiences and perceptions to critically and honestly assess Canadian, Afghan, UN and NATO policies. In the contemporary era, Alexander's account is broken into three major timeframes: (i) 2001-2004, which highlights the Bonn Process and the restoration of political authority in Afghanistan; (ii) 2005-2007, which examines resurgent conflict with increased Taliban activity and the partial deconstruction of all partnerships between President Karzai and the international community; and (iii) 2008-2010, which examines the American military surge and the push towards large-scale institution building and sustainable security initiatives. Alexander concludes with an optimistic look towards a future of peace in Afghanistan.

Some may interpret his optimism as naïveté, however he aptly notes that, "even the most intractable conflict inevitably grinds to a halt." To borrow from the title, the long way back to peace may transpire, but it must be remembered that the realization of peace, or even low-lying or latent conflict, is not sufficient for security.

The unique characteristic of Alexander perspective is his honesty; but, this honesty is both his greatest strength and weakness. If the reader of *The Long Way Back* is already convinced that peace and long-term security is achievable

in Afghanistan, Alexander effectively supports his argument through honest accounts framed in his distinctly genuinely optimistic tone. Illustrated examples of conversations, episodes and events highlight glimmers of hope, and measurable improvements in security and institution-building show how far Afghanistan has come in ten years.

Yet, Alexander's frankness is most compelling in his analysis of on-going and long-term security challenges. His candour and willingness to speak to episodes of corruption, pettiness and ineptitude underscores his genuine frustration with the country and its political actors. If the reader begins with a pessimistic outlook for Afghanistan's future, they will likely be quick to discredit Alexander's optimistic outlook.

Though there is compelling evidence presented, the reader may fixate their interpretation on the structural constraints preventing Afghanistan from reaching its potential. These conditions were an original source of pessimism for Alexander. Early in the book, he highlights the two main problems the international community and Afghanistan faced in 2003: the inability of states to commit to the substantial financing required to pacify the state, and the distraction of Iraq that was "monopolizing world attention" at the time. Alexander describes Afghanistan in 2004 as a country that, "in medical terms, [is] a patient who, after recovering from life-threatening trauma and the paralysis, still could not walk without assistance."

Alexander laments that these factors were a barrier to security and development, yet admits that precisely the same barriers exist today. The US, ISAF and NATO are challenged to find the resources required to sustain the Afghan National Security Force past 2014, and the West's attention was recently preoccupied by Libya, is currently focused upon the international debt crisis, and will no doubt find new distractions as time goes on. All to say, Afghanistan is lower than ever on the international priority list. If the reader draws parallels with Alexander's sentiments early on in the war and current realities, the logical conclusion is that Afghanistan may never leave the intensive care unit. Certainly, not all readers have such pessimistic worldviews and perhaps these readers were not Alexander's target audience.

Overall, the *The Long Way Back* is an in-depth and uniquely honest early history of ISAF's war in Afghanistan. Alexander's greatest strength is his refreshing honesty. However, given that the persuasiveness of Alexander's normative plea is constrained by his willingness to acknowledge empirical realities, honesty is no doubt also Alexander's greatest weakness. ©



Current and former CDA Institute Interns with the Chief Justice of Canada and the Chief of the Defence Staff at the Vimy Award dinner, 18 November 2011. L-R: Arnav Manchanda; Bonnie Butlin; Natalie Ratcliffe; Paul Hillier, current Intern; the Rt. Hon. Beverley McLaughlin, Chief Justice of Canada; Meghan Spilka O'Keefe; and General Walter Natynczyk, Chief of the Defence Staff.

Photo by: Lieutenant-Colonel Gord Metcalfe

Les stagiaires d'aujourd'hui et hier de l'Institut de la CAD avec le juge en chef du Canada et le chef de l'état-major de la Défense lors du dîner de la Distinction honorifique Vimy, le 18 novembre 2011. G-D: Arnav Manchanda; Bonnie Butlin; Natalie Ratcliffe; Paul Hillier, le stagiaire d'aujourd'hui; la très hon. Beverley McLaughlin, le juge en chef du Canada; Meghan Spilka O'Keefe; et le Général Walter Natynczyk, le chef de l'état-major de la Défense.

Photo: Lieutenant-Colonel Gord Metcalfe

ON TRACK



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